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In  essay one, my primary objective is to see the sensitivity of foreign exchange rate risk on firm 
performance in US manufacturing industry and examine if the hedging help reduce the foreign 
exchange rate risk. I am particularly interested in manufacturing industry because of the nature 
of business operation of manufacturing firms. Manufacturing firms in US are not only exposed to 
foreign exchange fluctuation from sales and revenue but also are exposed to foreign exchange 
rate risk for procurement, placement and investment. I find that the firms with extreme foreign 
exchange rate risk exposure exhibit lower daily return and firms with very low foreign exchange 
rate risk exhibit higher daily return using the portfolio approach.  I also find that the firms that 
hedge has lower foreign exchange rate exposure compared to firms that don’t hedge. The 
coefficient for hedge is negative and statistically significant. 
In essay two, I investigate the effect of executive compensation on exchange rate risk in US 
manufacturing industry. There is a large theoretical and empirical interest on executive 
compensation using agency framework that investigates the conflict of interest between 
shareholders and corporate executives. That interest has been largely aligned with the use of 
managerial performance dependent on observable measures of firm performance. Since US 
manufacturing firm is largely exposed to foreign exchange transactions by design, I investigate if 
the value of in-the-money unexercised vested executive stock option has any impact on foreign 
exchange rate exposure. I investigate if the value of in-the-money unexercised unvested 
executive stock option has any impact on executive stock option. Using pooled OLS, fixed effect 
panel data and random effect panel data, I find that in all 3 model value of in-the-money 
unexercised vested executive stock option has negative coefficient and is statistically significant. 
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At the same time in all 3 models the value of in-the-money unexercised unvested executive stock 

















Exchange Rate Sensitivity and Effectiveness of Hedging in US Manufacturing 
Industry 
1.0 Introduction 
A firm maximizes shareholders wealth by taking calculated risks in various areas directly related 
to its business. Other risks arise in the process of doing business for which no single firm enjoys 
any unique competitive advantage. The foreign exchange rate risk is an example of the second 
category. In the age of globalized competition firms continuously strive for competitive 
advantage in every stage of business. For manufacturing firms, this involves decisions from 
finding raw materials from overseas to export finished good to overseas market. This competitive 
advantage can be stymied by the exchange rate swings in the opposite direction, incentivizing 
firms to manage this risk.  
Take the example of a US car manufacturer that imports majority of the raw materials from 
overseas due to cost advantage and, exports a huge amount of finished product (i.e. cars) abroad. 
Now if the US dollar appreciates against major currencies or the currency of the concerned 
trading partner, from the cost point of view the car manufacturer has a gain because the cost of 
raw materials will be reduced, at the same time it will hurt the car manufacturer in the export 
market since the manufacturer’s car will be more expensive than cars manufactured in other 
countries. Conversely if the US dollar depreciates against major currencies or the currency of the 
concerned trading partner, then raw materials will become expensive but from the export point of 
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view the car manufacturer will gain a huge advantage since his/her cars will be cheaper than cars 
from competing car manufacturers belonging to other countries. 
According to Bartram (2008) degree of risk is a function of two variables- volatility of exchange 
rates and amount of exposure. Thus foreign exchange risk affects a firm’s accounting as well as 
market performance. Forbes (2002) examines how major depreciation affects firm performance. 
Forbes (2002) use 13,500 companies from around the world and find that year after depreciations 
firms have significantly higher growth in market capitalization, but significantly lower growth in 
net income. Forbes (2002) also finds that firms with greater foreign sales exposure have 
significantly better performance after depreciation. Kolari, Moorman and Sorescu (2008) found 
that the portfolios with the extreme exchange rate risk has significantly lower return compared to 
the portfolios that are not exposed to extreme exchange rate risk. Here extreme exchange rate 
risk as defined by Kolari, Moorman and Sorescu (2008) as “vulnerability of operating income 
when exchange rate either appreciate or depreciate significantly”.  
Corporate managers are, therefore, incentivized to actively manage exchange rate exposure via 
effective hedging. Wallace (2008) found that a modern risk management program is sustained 
over a period of time with the objective of raising the awareness level of key risks in the 
business, proactively mitigating significant risks, incorporating risk management into capital 
allocation decisions and strong controls and meaningful reporting.  Wallace (2008) pointed out 
few common mistakes by multinational companies when it comes to foreign exchange hedging: 
First, substantial and pervasive foreign exchange risk denial; second, the belief that foreign 
exchange rate changes even out over time, causing  companies to underestimate  foreign 
exchange rate exposure; third, assuming that derivatives are the best way to manage foreign 
exchange exposure; fourth, limited reporting; fifth, no foreign exchange performance analysis of  
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hedging; sixth, refusing to use options because they are “too expensive”; and seventh, obsession 
on whether derivatives makes money. 
Managing foreign exchange exposure involves taking the appropriate measures to eliminate or 
hedge against the risk. To hedge a foreign exchange exposure, one takes an equal and opposite 
position from that of the exposure. For example, if a firm has a long position in US dollar, it 
would have to take an offsetting short position to hedge their exposure. One who is long in a 
market is betting on an increase in the value of the thing, whereas with a short position they are 
betting on a fall in its value. Executives can choose to not hedge, selectively hedge or 
systematically hedge as part of risk management. Executives can take natural position which is a 
situation where company’s operations are covered against foreign exchange risk. Executives can 
also choose foreign exchange forward, futures or swaps, as well as foreign exchange call or put 
options. Each method has its pros and cons.  
To illustrate process of hedging let’s take a look at a simple example. A US manufacturing 
company has a division that operates in Mexico.  At the end of June the parent company 
anticipates that the foreign division will have profits of 4 million Mexican pesos (P) to repatriate.  
The parent company has a foreign exchange exposure, as the dollar value of the profits will rise 
and fall with changes in the exchange value between the P and the dollar. The firm is long the 
peso, so to hedge its exposure it will go short [sell P] in the futures market. The face amount of 
each peso future contract is P500,000, so the firm will go short 8 contracts. If the peso 
depreciates, the dollar value of its Mexican division’s profits falls, but the futures account 
generates profits, at least partially offsetting the loss.  The opposite holds for an appreciation of 
the peso. An increase in the value of the peso increases the dollar value of the underlying long 
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position and decreases the value of the futures position. A decrease in the value of the peso 
decreases the value of the underlying position and increases the value of the futures position 
I use the FASB required income statement item called after-tax amount of unrealized gain/loss 
on derivative transactions or cash flow hedges and “gains and loss from imperfect hedging” - 
which is the amount of gain or loss on a hedge transaction that exceeds the risk faced by the 
company, to find out whether imperfect hedging is causing foreign exchange exposure. 
This research will contribute to the existing literature on foreign exchange rate risk and hedging. 
I do a comprehensive study on manufacturing industry in US using daily return for all the firms 
that existed from 1992 to 2012 and capture the foreign exchange rate exposure for all firms as 
well as for all firms in each year. I use the portfolio approach to find the sensitivity of foreign 
exchange rate exposure on daily return for the portfolio. The findings will be helpful in 
understanding international financial management for US manufacturing firms. 
All previous research related to hedging is primarily based on survey data. The main reason for 
that is hedge data was not reported by firms clearly until recently when FASB (Financial 
Accounting Standard Board) required all firms to report accounting for derivative instrument and 
hedge activities through SFAS No. 133. Compustat reports on hedge related yearly data is 
available through 2006. I use income statement data called after tax unrealized gain/loss on 
derivative transaction and cash flow hedges and look at the break down to determine if a firm 
hedged in a particular year. To best of my knowledge use of accounting data to determine 
whether a firm hedged or not hasn’t been done previously. Consequently this research will open 
door for future research on hedging without the use of survey data. 
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The intuition of risk management implies that imperfect or not hedging will cause bigger 
exchange rate exposure. On the other hand firms that are hedging will have very little foreign 
exchange exposure. The finding of this study is consistent with this intuition. I find that firms 
that hedge has lower foreign exchange rate exposure compared to the foreign exchange rate 
exposure of the firms that do not hedge. 
2.0 Literature Review 
2.1 Literature related to firm performance and exchange rate risk 
Dominguez and Tesar (2006) examine the relationship between exchange rate movement and 
firm value, and find that for a significant fraction of firm, the exchange rate movement is a factor 
and the direction of exposure depends on the specific exchange rate and varies over time. 
Dominguez and Tesar (2006)  use Data stream OECD data between 1980 to 1999 period that 
include 300 firms each for 8 countries including Chile, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The 
Netherlands, Thailand and United Kingdom.  
Hirshleifer, Hou and Teoh (2009) examines whether the firm-level accrual and cash flow effects 
extend to the aggregate stock market .In sharp contrast to previous firm-level findings, aggregate 
accruals is a strong positive time series predictor of aggregate stock returns, and cash flows is a 
negative predictor. In addition, Hirshleifer, Hou and Teoh (2009)  finds innovations in accruals 
are negatively contemporaneously correlated with aggregate returns , and innovations in cash 
flows are positively correlated with returns. These findings suggest that innovations in accruals 
and cash flows contain information about changes in discount rates, or that firms manage 
earnings in response to market wide undervaluation. Hirshleifer, Hou and Teoh (2009) use the 
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value-weighted portfolio of the subsample of CRSP firms that have sufficient accounting 
information to calculate operating accruals and cash flows (SAMPLERET). 
Santos and Veronesi (2010) explores Non-linear external habit persistence models, which feature 
prominently in the recent ‘‘equity premium’’ asset pricing and macroeconomics literature, 
generate counter factual predictions in the cross- section of stock returns. Santos and Veronesi 
2010 show that in the absence of cross-sectional heterogeneity in firms’ cash-flow risk, these 
models produce a ‘‘growth premium,’’ that is, stocks with high price-to-fundamental ratios 
command a higher premium than stocks with low price-to-fundamental ratios. Santos and 
Veronesi (2010) simulate 10 years of quarterly data of 200 firms that then sort into 10 portfolios 
according to price-dividend ratio. 
HE and NG (1998) examine the exchange rate exposure of Japanese Multinational Corporations. 
HE and NG (1998) find that about 25% of 171 Japanese firms are having positive exchange rate 
exposure. HE and NG (1998) find that highly leveraged firms with low liquidity have low 
exposure and it increase with firm size. 
Jorin (1990) examines the exposure of U.S. multinationals to foreign currency risk. Jorin (1990) 
presents evidence that the relationship between stock returns and exchange rates differs 
systematically across multinationals. Jorin (1990) focuses on the determinants of exchange- rate 
exposure. Jorin (1990) finds that he comovement between stock returns and the value of the 
dollar is positively related to the percentage of foreign operations of U.S. multinationals. 
Patro, Wald and Wu (2002) estimate a time-varying two-factor international asset pricing model 
for weekly equity index returns of 16 OECD countries. A trade-weighted basket of exchange 
rates and the MSCI world market index are used as risk factors. Patro, Wald and Wu (2002)  find 
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significant currency risk exposures in country equity index returns. Patro, Wald and Wu (2002) 
explain these currency betas using several country-specific macroeconomic variables with a 
panel approach. Patro, Wald and Wu (2002) find that imports, exports, credit ratings, and tax 
revenues significantly affect currency risks in a way that is consistent with some economic 
hypotheses. Patro, Wald and Wu (2002) draws similar conclusion by using lagged explanatory 
variables, and thus these macroeconomic variables may be useful as predictors of currency risk 
exposures. 
Forbes (2002) examines how major depreciation affects firm performance. Forbes (2002) use 
13,500 companies from around the world and find that year after depreciations firms have 
significantly higher growth in market capitalization, but significantly lower growth in net 
income. Forbes (2002) also finds that firms with greater foreign sales exposure have significantly 
better performance after depreciation. Forbes (2002) use performance as a dependent variable 
and depreciation as a dummy independent variable, inflation as an independent variable and 
period as a vector dummy variable.  
Friberg ang Ganslandt (2007) look into the impact of exchange rate change on cash flow. Friberg 
ang Ganslandt (2007) use a simulation method using Monte Carlo approach and find that 
different brands face different exchange rate risk. Friberg ang Ganslandt (2007) use the market 
of bottled water in Sweeden and examine the data to look at points in the distribution of median 
profits. Friberg ang Ganslandt (2007) use historical Cash flows to generate a large pool of 
forecast errors on cash flows. Friberg ang Ganslandt (2007) find profound impact of exchange 
rate on competitive position and profitability of many firms. 
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Bartram (2007) estimates the foreign exchange rate exposure of 6917 U.S. nonfinancial firms on 
the basis of stock prices and corporate cash flows. Bartram (2007) shows that several firms are 
significantly exposed to at least one of the foreign exchange rates including Canadian Dollar, 
Japanese Yen and Euro, and significant exposures are more frequent at longer horizons. The 
percentage of firms for which stock price and earnings exposures are significantly different is 
relatively low, though it increases with time horizon. Overall, the impact of exchange rate risk on 
stock prices and cash flows is similar and determined by a related set of economic factors. 
Hsin, Shiah-Hou and Chang (2007) investigates the absence of prevailing evidence on the 
significant exposure of US stocks to exchange rate risk by considering a firm’s pre-hedging 
currency exposure, its expected hedging activity and the delayed reaction of its stocks to 
currency movements. Hsin, Shiah-Hou and Chang (2007)  demonstrate the importance of lagged 
exposure relative to contemporaneous exposure and include the lagged effect in the exposure 
measurement that fails to raise the significance of the exchange rate risk with regard to the 
pricing for the overall sample of stocks. Hsin, Shiah-Hou and Chang (2007) demonstrate that the 
weak evidence on priced currency risk is at least partly attributable to hedging activity, 
particularly for large firms. Hsin, Shiah-Hou and Chang (2007) provide support for the 
asymmetric hedging hypothesis, in that asymmetric hedging is found to be responsible for 
reshaping the relationship between a firm’s characteristics and its currency exposure. 
Bartram (2008) presents results from an in-depth analysis of the foreign exchange rate exposure 
of a large nonfinancial firm based on proprietary internal data including cash flows, derivatives 
and foreign currency debt, as well as external capital market data. While the operations of the 
multinational firm have significant exposure to foreign exchange rate risk due to foreign 
currency-based activities and international competition, corporate hedging mitigates this gross 
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exposure. Bartram (2008) illustrates that the insignificance of foreign exchange rate exposures of 
comprehensive performance measures such as total cash flow can be explained by hedging at the 
firm level. Bartram (2008) finds that the residual net exposure is economically and statistically 
small, even if the operating cash flows of the firm are significantly exposed to exchange rate risk. 
Bartram (2008) suggest that managers of nonfinancial firms with operations exposed to foreign 
exchange rate risk take savvy actions to reduce exposure to a level too low to allow its detection 
empirically. 
Irvine and Pontiff (2008) find that idiosyncratic return volatility has dramatically increased and 
is mirrored by volatility of fundamental cash flow. Irvine and Pontiff (2008) use various cross-
section and time-series test to support the idea. Irvine and Pontiff (2008) use data from 
CRSP/Compustat merged database. Irvine and Pontiff (2008) use quarterly data that has sales, 
depreciation and amortization, end-of-quarter stock price, number of common shares used to 
calculate earnings per share, and earnings per shsre excluding extraordinary items. Irvine and 
Pontiff (2008) examines cash flow volatility using three different measures, i) earning per share, 
ii) cah flow per share – calculated as adding depreciation per share to earning, and iii) Sales per 
share. Irvine and Pontiff (2008) also control for documented persistence in cash flow.  
Muller and Verschoor (2009) examine the relationship between financial crisis exchange rate 
variability and equity return volatility for US multinationals. Muller and Verschoor (2009)  
performs empirical analysis of the major financial crises of the last decades that reveals the stock 
return variability increases significantly in the aftermath of a crisis, even relative to the increase 
in stock return volatility for other firms belonging to the same industry and market capitalization 
class. Muller and Verschoor (2009) also find that in conjunction with this increase in total 
volatility, there is also an increase in stock market risk for multinational firms. Muller and 
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Verschoor (2009) suggest that trade and service oriented industries appear to be particularly 
sensitive to these changing exchange rate conditions. 
Huffman, Makar and Beyer (2010) investigate the likelihood of extreme foreign exchange-rate 
exposure, conditioning upon key firm factors and an expanded view of hedging. Huffman, Makar 
and Beyer (2010)  incorporate the Fama and French (1993) three-factor (FF three-factor) model 
terms in reconciling equity returns and exchange-rate exposure Huffman, Makar and Beyer 
(2010) suggest that consistent with effective hedging, non-hedging firms tend to have greater 
foreign exchange-rate exposure than hedging firms. Huffman, Makar and Beyer (2010) also find 
all key factors that explain the likelihood of high foreign exchange-rate exposure are 
economically and statistically significant using the more complete FF three-factor model. 
Huffman, Makar and Beyer (2010) conclude that firm size is important in explaining foreign 
exchange-rate exposure and more foreign exchange-rate exposure coefficients that are significant 
using the FF three-factor model compared to the traditional market model. 
Bali and Wu (2010) investigates the significance of an inter temporal relation between expected 
returns on countries’ stock market portfolios and their risk exposures to the world market 
portfolio. Bali and Wu (2010) find that inter temporal risk–return relation differs significantly 
under different currency denominations. Bali and Wu (2010) find that the slope coefficient is the 
largest at around seven when the returns are denominated in Japanese yen, moderate at about five 
when the returns are denominated in the Canadian or US dollars, and the smallest at around three 
when the returns are denominated in pound or euro and its predecessors.  Bali and Wu (2010) 
find the ranking of the risk–return coefficients across different currency denominations remains 
the same when the study replace country equity indices with global industry portfolios in 
estimating the inter temporal relations, when Bali and Wu (2010) change the return frequency 
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from monthly to daily, and when Bali and Wu (2010) consider different specifications for the 
conditional covariance process. 
Williamson (2000) examines the effect of real exchange rate changes on multinational firms and 
incorporates the effect of intra-industry competition on the relation between exchange rates and 
firm value. Williamson (2000) conducts tests using a sample of automotive firms from the 
United States and Japan. Consistent with theoretical predictions, Williamson (2000) finds that 
there is significant exposure to exchange rate shocks. Moreover, Williamson (2000) find 
evidence of time-variation in exchange rate exposure, which is consistent with changes in the 
competitive environment within the industry. Williamson (2000) presents evidence that is 
consistent with foreign sales being a major determinant of exposure and the effectiveness of 
operational hedging through foreign production. 
Friberg and Ganslandt (2007) extend a simulation method developed in industrial organization to 
answer how exchange rate exposure impact firm’s cash flow. Friberg and Ganslandt (2007)  use 
prices, quantities, and product characteristics for differentiated products, coupled with a discrete 
choice framework and an assumption of price competition, to estimate marginal costs for all 
producers. Friberg and Ganslandt (2007) Use a Monte Carlo approach and generate 
counterfactual prices and profits for different levels of exchange rates. Friberg and Ganslandt 
2007 illustrate the method using the market for bottled water. Friberg and Ganslandt (2007) find 
that even in a relatively simple market such as this one, different brands face very different 





2.2 Literature related to hedging 
Wilosn and Rasch (1998) find that as financial market players have become more competent in 
identifying and evaluating financial risks, their risk management tools have become more 
creative. FASB has been hard-pressed to keep pace with the rapid development of these new 
products, resulting in a somewhat piecemeal, and often internally inconsistent, set of rules to 
account for these instruments. Wilosn and Rasch (1998) argues that FASB began deliberating 
issues related to derivatives and hedging activities in January 1992. Because of the urgency for 
improved financial information about derivatives and related activities, FASB decided to redirect 
some of its efforts toward enhanced disclosures. In October 1994, FASB issued SFAS No. 119, 
Disclosure about Derivative Financial Instruments and Fair Value of Financial Instruments, as an 
interim step. In June 1998, SFAS No. 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging 
Activities, was issued. It deals with recognition and measurement and provides comprehensive 
guidance for all derivatives--even those instruments yet to be developed. Although not a perfect 
solution, the new approach of SFAS No.133 addresses many of the problems with previous 
accounting. According to Wilosn and Rasch (1998) it reduced Inconsistency. SFAS No. 52, 
Foreign Currency Translation, assessed risk on a transaction basis, while SFAS No. 80, 
Accounting for Futures Contracts, required the risk condition to be assessed on an enterprise 
level. An action taken to reduce the risk of an individual item could simultaneously increase risk 
exposure of the enterprise as a whole. SFAS No. 80 allowed hedge accounting for both firm 
commitments and forecasted transactions, while SFAS No. 52 allowed only firm commitments to 
be hedged.  
January 1997, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued Financial Reporting 
Release No. 48 (hereafter “FRR 48”), which, effective for all firms for fiscal year ending after 
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June 15, 1998, expands disclosure requirements for market risk.8 Under FRR 48, firms are 
required to present quantitative information about market risk in one of the three formats, 
namely. Tabular, sensitivity analysis, or Value-at-Risk - Under this method, instruments should 
be classified by the following characteristics: (1) fixed or variable rate assets or liabilities; (2) 
long or short forwards or futures, including those with physical delivery; (3) written or purchased 
put or call options with similar strike prices; and, (4) receive fixed or variable swaps. FRR 48 
requires disclosures of contract amounts and weighted average settlement prices for forwards and 
futures, weighted average pay and receive rates and/or prices for swaps, and contract amounts 
and weighted average strike prices for options. 
Aretz, Bartram and Dufey(2007) find that when there are imperfections in capital markets, 
corporate hedging can enhance shareholder value through its impact on agency costs, costly 
external financing, direct and indirect costs of bankruptcy, as well as taxes. Aretz, Bartram and 
Dufey(2007) also find that  corporate hedging can alleviate underinvestment and asset 
substitution problems by reducing the volatility of cash flows, and it can accommodate the risk 
aversion of undiversified managers and increase the effectiveness of managerial incentive 
structures through eliminating unsystematic risk.  Aretz, Bartram and Dufey(2007) show that 
lower volatility of cash flows also leads to lower bankruptcy costs and corporate hedging can 
also align the availability of internal resources with the need for investment funds, helping firms 
to avoid costly external financing. Aretz, Bartram and Dufey(2007) also find that corporate risk 
management can reduce the corporate tax burden in the presence of convex tax schedules. Aretz, 
Bartram and Dufey(2007) find empirical support for rationales of hedging at the firm level.  
Campbell and Viceira(2010) finds that for the period 1975 to 2005, the U.S. dollar, the euro, and 
the Swiss franc moved against world equity markets. Campbell and Viceira(2010) argues that the 
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risk-minimizing currency strategy for a global bond investor is close to a full currency hedge, 
with a modest long position in the U.S. dollar. Campbell and Viceira(2010) finds little evidence 
that risk minimizing investors should adjust their currency positions in response to movements in 
interest differentials. 
Adam, Chitru and Fernando (2005) document that gold mining firms have consistently realized 
economically significant cash flow gains from their derivatives transactions. Adam, Chitru and 
Fernando (2005)  conclude that these cash flows have increased shareholder value since there is 
no evidence of an offsetting adjustment in firms’ systematic risk. Adam, Chitru and Fernando 
(2005) finding contradicts a central assumption in the risk management literature that derivatives 
transactions have zero net present value, and highlights an important motive for firms to use 
derivatives that the literature has hitherto ignored. Adam, Chitru and Fernando (2005)e find 
considerable evidence of selective hedging in our sample, the cash flow gains from selective 
hedging appear to be small at best. Adam, Chitru and Fernando (2005) use hedge ratio based on 
survey data on 244 fortune 500 firms. 
Jin and Jorion(2006) studies the hedging activities of 119 U.S. oil and gas producers from 1998 
to 2001 and evaluates their effect on firm value. Theories of hedging based on market 
imperfections imply that hedging should increase the firm’s market value. To test this 
hypothesis, Jin and Jorion(2006)  collect detailed information on the extent of hedging and on the 
valuation of oil and gas reserves. Jin and Jorion(2006) find that hedging reduces the firm’s stock 
price sensitivity to oil and gas prices. Contrary to previous studies, however, Jin and 
Jorion(2006)  find that hedging does not seem to affect market values for this industry. Jin and 
Jorion(2006) obtain hedging information from 1998 to 2001 annual reports. 
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Liu and Parlour (2009) consider firms that wish to minimize variability in their internal capital. 
The firms can hedge the cash flow risk of the project, but not that of winning or losing the 
auction. Liu and Parlour (2009) characterize optimal hedging and bidding strategies in this 
competition frame work. Liu and Parlour (2009) show that access to financial markets makes 
firms bid more aggressively, possibly even above their valuation for the project. Liu and Parlour 
(2009) find that hedging increases the variance of bids and makes firm values more dispersed.  
Mian (1996) provides empirical evidence on the determinants of corporate hedging decisions. 
Mian (1996) examines the evidence in light of currently mandated financial reporting 
requirements and, in particular, the constraints placed on anticipatory hedging. Mian (1996) 
obtains hedging data from 1992 annual reports for a sample of 3,022 firms. Mian (1996)  finds 
that out of the 771 firms classified as hedgers, 543 firms disclose information in their annual 
reports on their hedging activities; the remaining 228 firms report use of derivatives but no 
information on hedging activities. Based on the evidence, Mian (1996) finds that evidence is 
inconsistent with financial distress cost models; evidence is mixed with respect to contracting 
cost, capital market imperfections, and tax-based models; and evidence uniformly supports the 
hypothesis that hedging activities exhibit economies of scale. 
Perfect and Howton (2000) examines whether the design of managerial compensation contracts 
affects a firm’s hedging policy. Perfect and Howton (2000) use a recently developed empirical 
methodology to quantify the sensitivity of a firm’s value to the interaction of its internal funds 
and the price changes in exogenous hedge able risks. Perfect and Howton (2000)  use this 
approach as it permits an examination of the relation between managerial compensation and 
corporate hedging activities. Perfect and Howton (2000)  suggest that differences in the risk 
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exposure of the sample firms is related to the levels of stock options and deferred compensation 
used by the firms.  
3.0 Foreign Exchange Rate Exposure – Portfolio Approach 
3.1 Methodology  
In this study, first I capture the exchange rate exposure of manufacturing firms in US. Then I 
rank the firms based on foreign exchange exposure. After ranking the firms I create 25 portfolios 
following Vassalou (2000) and Kolari, Moorman and Sorescu (2008) and try to see the 
relationship between the exchange rate exposure and daily return using portfolio approach 
Looking into the work of Dumas (1983), subsequent empirical work by Jorion (1990), Bodnar 
and Marston (2002) and Kolari, Moorman and Sorescu (2008), I measures foreign exchange rate 
exposure for each firm by regressing its daily stock return variables (Rjt). FXRt captures the 
return on the US dollar per currency basket. The main approach is based on Fama-French-
Carhart (1997): 
Rjt = αj+ β1j (MKTRFt) + β 2 j SMBt + β 3 j HMLt + β 4 jUMDt + β 5 j FXRt + εjt  …………..( 1) 
Where, Rjt = Daily stock return for j firm in t time, MKTFRt = Daily market return minus risk free 
return in t time, SMBt = Daily return on portfolio of small stock minus the return on portfolio of 
large US stock in time t. HMLt = Daily return on portfolio of high book to market stocks minus 
the return on portfolio of low book to market US stock in time t. UMDt = Daily return on 
portfolio of past winner stocks minus past loser stocks in time t. FXRt = Daily Change in Federal 
Reserve’s Trade weighted currency (Broad Currency) Index return in time t.  
Following Kolari, Moorman and Sorescu (2008) I also check the consistency with  
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Rjt = αj+ β5j FXRt + εjt  ……………………………………..…………………………..( 2) 
Then I capture the coefficient of foreign exchange index return for all firms and rank them from 
low to high coefficient. I then create 25 portfolio of firms based on the first to last portfolio. The 
first portfolio will have the extreme negative foreign exchange rate exposure and the last 
portfolio will have the extreme positive foreign exchange exposure. The portfolios in the middle 
will have lower foreign exchange rate exposure. I perform regression for each portfolio 
separately using equation (1) and capture portfolio foreign exchange rate exposure and calculate 
portfolio return. Then I graph the portfolio return and portfolio foreign exchange rate exposure 
so see the pattern. 
3.2 Data description and foreign exchange risk exposure 
The sources of data in this study are the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), Federal 
Reserve Bank Reports and Fama-French Portfolios and Factors. From Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP), I use CRSP/Compustat Merged Database - Security Daily and find daily 
closing price and calculate the return from it.  Initial data set has 12,665,108 observations from 
January 1, 1992 to December 31, 2011. During this period I have 5,041 working days. I choose 
the firms having Sic code between 2000 and 4000 that represents manufacturing firms. The 
initial data set has 6,117 firms.  
I obtain Fama-French factor daily frequency for the time period of January 1, 1992 to December 
31, 2011 from WRDS. I obtain SMB (Small Minus Big) that is the average return on the three 
small portfolios minus the average return on the three big portfolios, SMB = 1/3 (Small Value + 
Small Neutral + Small Growth) - 1/3 (Big Value + Big Neutral + Big Growth).  SMB for July of 
year t to June of t+1 include all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks for which market equity 
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data for December of t-1 and June of t, and (positive) book equity data for t-1, exists. I have 
5,041 observations for the study and denote it as SMB. I also obtain HML (High Minus Low) 
that is the average return on the two value portfolios minus the average return on the two growth 
portfolios, HML =  1/2 (Small Value + Big Value) - 1/2 (Small Growth + Big Growth). HML for 
July of year t to June of t+1 include all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks for which market 
equity data for December of t-1 and June of t, and (positive) book equity data for t-1, exist. I also 
obtain UMD (up minus down) Momentum (Up Minus Down as defined by Fama French). I also 
obtain MKTRF (or Rm-Rf)  that is the excess return on the market. It is calculated as the value-
weight return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks (from CRSP) minus the one-month 
Treasury bill rate. I also get the UMD which calculated the momentum. 
[Insert Table 1] 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for SMB, HML, UMD and Market return minus risk free 
return. During the sample period SMB has a mean of .000042 with a maximum value of .04 and 
a minimum value of -.04. The standard deviation of the sample is 0.0053. During the sample 
period HML has a mean of .0000148 with a maximum value of .03 and a minimum value of -.04. 
The standard deviation of the sample is 0.0054. During the sample period UMD has a mean of 
.0003 with a maximum value of .07 and a minimum value of -.08. The standard deviation of the 
sample is 0.0077. During the sample period MKTRF has a mean of .00029 with a maximum 
value of .09 and a minimum value of -.09. The standard deviation of the sample is 0.0097. 
The multilateral trade-weighted index of the foreign exchange value of the U.S. dollar against the 
currencies of the other countries in the Group of Ten (G-10), developed at the Federal Reserve 
Board in 1971, has played an important role in analysis of foreign influences on the U.S. 
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economy for more than twenty-five years. However, changes in international trading 
relationships and in the structure of international financial markets have led to increased interest 
in the currencies of U.S. trading partners outside the G-10 countries. The trade weighted 
currency index is that of the currencies of important U.S. trading partners. This group is the basis 
for the construction of what the staff terms the broad index of the dollar’s foreign exchange 
value. The broad index includes thirty-five currencies until the beginning of Stage III of EMU on 
January 1, 1999.  At that time, the euro will replace the ten euro-area currencies, and the broad 
index will have twenty-six currencies. Shares in U.S. trade largely determined the currency 
selection for the broad index. The currencies of all foreign countries or regions that had a share 
of U.S. non-oil imports or nonagricultural exports of at least 1⁄2 percent in 1997 are included in 
the broad indexes, as rankings of U.S. trading partners by share of U.S. trade in that year. The 
countries with currencies in the broad index are also important in global trade. The countries and 
regions whose currencies are included in the indexes generate more than 75 percent of the 
world’s gross national product (outside the United States), measured on the basis of purchasing 
power parity. The list of currencies included in the broad index is re-evaluated annually when the 
currency weights are updated1. 
In this study I obtain the daily trade-weighted index and calculate the daily index return as 
 FXRt = (FXt – FXt-1)/FXt-1. 
Where, FXRt = daily trade weighted index return,  FXt = trade weighted index in current time, 
FXt-1 = trade weighted index in pervious time. Table1 reports summary statistics for daily stock 
1 Federal Reserve Bulletin October 1998 
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return. During the sample period FXRt has a mean of -.000023 with a maximum value of 0.02 
and a minimum value of -0.04. The standard deviation of the sample is 0.004. 
I use daily closing stock price from CRISP. The Data range from January 1, 1992 to December 
31, 2011. I found 6,131 firms that have complete data set of up to 5,041 days. Out of that few 
firms have completely blank data so I drop those firms and final number of firm in this study is 
6,117. The total number of observation in the study is 12,665,108. A return is the change in the 
total value of an investment in a common stock over some period of time per dollar of initial 
investment. RET(I) is the return for a sale on day I. It is based on a purchase on the most recent 
time previous to I when the security had a valid price. Usually, this time is I - 1. Returns are 
calculated as :For time t (a holding period), let: t = time of last available price < t, r(t) = return on 
purchase at t, sale at t, p(t) = last sale price or closing bid/ask average at time t, d(t) = cash 
adjustment for t, f(t) = price adjustment factor for t, p(t) = last sale price or closing bid/ask 
average at time of last available price < t.  Then I subtract the daily risk free return and calculate 
the daily excess return. 
[Insert table 2] 
The raw data has few extreme values with a maximum return of 1595% and a minimum return of 
-97%. Such extreme values are outliers that can potentially affect the outcome. So I followed 
Huber (1981) and Ruymagaart (1981) method of dropping 500 extreme observation from top and 
bottom. By extreme I mean observations with ridiculously high or low daily return. I found few 
observations with over 1000% daily return or -90% daily returns. Those are definitely outliers. 
So I remove 500 very high return observations and 500 very low return observations. The final 
number of observation in the study stands at 12,664,108. Table 2 reports the year by year break 
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down of all firm return during the period of 1992 through 2011, with a grand average of .08% 
daily return. In the year of 2011, 2008 and 2002 the average return in negative in the other 17 
years have positive return. The lowest return is observed in 2011 (-0.00051) and highest return is 
observed in the year 2009 (0.0032). I observe that number of firm increase every year from 1992 
to 1997. In 1992 the number of manufacturing firm stood at 2769 and in 1997 the number 
reached 3510.Since 1997 every year the number dropped and in 2011 I have 1820 manufacturing 
firms. Using equation 1 I capture the coefficient of foreign exchange rate on yearly basis. I find 
that in year 1996, 2000, 2001,2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 the 
coefficient is negative and in 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2002 the coefficient 
is positive. The maximum value of foreign exchange rate exposure is 0.05877 and that took place 
in 1992, the lowest value of foreign exchange rate exposure took place in 2003 and the value is -
0.00456. The average daily return for the entire sample is 0.000805 and the average of foreign 
exchange rate exposure is -0.0288 
3.3 Result of portfolio analysis 
From equation 1, I capture foreign exchange rate exposure – which is the coefficient of FXR (β 5 
j) for each firm. Out of 6,131 firms that I examine in the study 3,862 firms has the foreign 
exchange rate exposure (β 5 j ) that has a T-statistics greater than 1.67. So in our study 63% 
coefficients are statistically significant. I rank the 6,131 foreign exchange rate exposures that I 
collect from running 6,131 regressions from lowest to highest. After that I remove few firms 
with too extreme values, that is firms having of extreme foreign exchange exposure and firms 
having extreme mean return. I trim the number of firm to 6,075. Then I divide the 6,075 firms 
into 25 portfolios - each portfolio having 243 firms.  
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[Insert Table 3] 
Table 3 reports the result of 25 regression results using equation one and two. The results are 
consistent. From equation 1 I observe that, for portfolio number 1 the foreign exchange exposure 
is -7.047 and when I use equation 2 I observe that the foreign exchange exposure is -7.18. The T-
stats for both the equation is very close -2.53 and -2.87. For portfolio number 25, the foreign 
exchange rate exposure is 1.03 using equation 1 and 1.10 using equation 2. Both the coefficients 
are statistically significant at 2.3 and 2.5. For the portfolios in the middle of the pack like 
portfolio number 12 or 13 the portfolio coefficient is not statistically significant using either of 
the equation. But both equation gives similar and close and consistent result. 
[Insert Table 4] 
From the regression I capture portfolio foreign exchange rate exposure and I also calculate inter 
temporal portfolio mean for each portfolio. I report the portfolio mean and portfolio foreign 
exchange rate exposure in table 4. The portfolio with extreme foreign exchange rate exposure i.e. 
portfolio 1 and 25 has negative daily return of -.00011 and -.000112 and the foreign exchange 
rate exposure for those to portfolios are -7.05 and 1.033 respectively and Tstat for the 
coefficients are statistically significant. On the other hand the portfolios right in the middle i.e., 
portfolio # 12 and # 13 has a return of .0021 and .0018 and the portfolio foreign exchange rate 
exposure is -.055 and .015 respectively. I plot the portfolio foreign exchange rate exposure on X 
axis and port polio return on Y axis. I find that the portfolios that exhibit extreme foreign 
exchange rate exposure has lower return and Portfolios that exhibit lower foreign exchange rate 
exposure has higher return.  
[Insert Figure 1] 
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Figure 1 shows the inverse U relation ship between portfolio retrun versus portfolio risk 
exposure. It tells us that the firms that are exposed to too much foreign exchange rate risk exhibit 
lower daily return and firms with low foreign exchange rate risk exhibit high daily return. 
Vasslou (2000) finds that the common component of exchange risk is not priced but the residual 
component of the exchange risk has a positive market price. Vasslou (2000) restricts the analysis 
to only 400 companies that have continuously been traded during the sample period. Vasslou 
(2000) uses relative coarse measure of foreign exchange-sensitivity by dividing US firms into 
eight portfolios according to their loading on the world market factor, foreign exchange, and 
inflation factors. Our finding is inconsistent with Vasslou (2000) in terms of market price for 
exchange rate risk. In our finding I observe that for 63% of the firms the coefficient for exchange 
rate is significant on market return. 
He and Ng(1998) use quarterly data of 171 Japanese Multinational firms between 1979 and 
1993. He and Ng (1998) obtain data from Pacific Basin Capital Markets (PACAP) and find that 
for the period from January 1979 to December 1993, 25 percent of the 171 Japanese 
multinationals have significant positive exposure. In this study I observe that 3,180 firms have 
negative exposure and 2,924 firms have positive exposure. 
Kolari, Moorman and Sorescu (2008) use monthly data for all the stock listed on 2003 CRSP 
database excluding financial firms. For book to market data Kolari, Moorman and Sorescu 
(2008) use COMPUSTAT data base.  Kolari, Moorman and Sorescu (2008) measure US dollar 
(USD) returns against the Federal Reserve’s Major Currencies Index (MCI) based on foreign 
exchange values of the dollar against currencies of major industrial countries. Kolari, Moorman 
and Sorescu (2008) is in contrast with prediction of standard asset pricing models that suggest a 
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linear relationship between expected and risk factor loading. I observe similar inverse “U” 
relationship between portfolio return and exchange rate that was found by Kolari, Moorman and 
Sorecscu (2008). 
4.0 Effectiveness of Hedging 
4.1 Research design: 
In this section I examine the effect of hedging on foreign exchange exposure. Financial managers 
often engage in hedging activity as an insurance against risk and exposure. If a firm has higher 
risk exposure it can result in significant performance decline, so in order to reduce the risk 
financial manager take an opposite position in the foreign exchange market to protect against 
possible loss. A financial manager would also aim to reduce the exposure over time. 
Consequently, one would expect that the firm that hedges regularly will have a lower foreign 
exchange rate exposure compared to the firm that is not engaged in hedging. I explore that aspect 
of the relationship between hedging and exchange rate exposure in this study. 
In this context I use the methodology from the work of Dumas (1983), subsequent empirical 
work by Jorion (1990), Bodnar and Marston (2002) and Kolari, Moorman and Sorescu (2008), I 
measures foreign exchange rate exposure for each firm by regressing its daily stock return 
variables (R1jt). FXR1t captures the return on the US dollar per currency basket. The main 
approach is based on Fama-French-Carhart (1997): 
R1nk = τj+ γ1kp (MKTRF1n) + γ 2 kp SMB1n + γ3 kp HML1n + γ 4 kpUMD1n + γ5 kp FXR1n + υkp     ( 3) 
Where, R1nk = Daily stock return for k firm in n time, MKTFR1n= Daily market return minus risk 
free return in n time, SMB1n = Daily return on portfolio of small stock minus the return on 
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portfolio of large US stock in time n. HML1n = Daily return on portfolio of high book to market 
stocks minus the return on portfolio of low book to market US stock in time n. UMD1n = Daily 
return on portfolio of past winner stocks minus past loser stocks in time n. FXR1n = Daily 
Change in Federal Reserve’s Trade weighted currency (Broad Currency) Index in time n.  
The primary difference between equation 1 and equation 3 lies in the coefficient output. In 
equation 1 I capture the coefficients for each firm for the entire sample period, but in equation 3 I 
capture coefficients for each firm in each year for the sample period.  From equation 3 I will 
primarily get the yearly exchange rate exposure which will be captured in  γ5 kp . For each firm γ5 
kp will give us yearly risk exposure. Using these observations I try to establish the relationship 
between hedge and risk exposure following Wilosn and Rasch (1998). I will use the captured 
coefficient from equation 3 γ5 kp  as the dependent variable. I will denote it as EXP, as the 
independent variable I will use Hedge which is a dummy variable, if the firm hedge in the year 
the value will be 1 and if the firm does not hedge in that year the value will be 0. As a control 
variable I use the foreign sales value that I got from segment data and use foreign sales as a 
percentage of total asset. I denote is by FxSales. I also use capital expenditure as a dependent 
variable and denote it as CapExpenditure 
EXPmz  =θ + σ1Hedgemz + σ2FxSalesmz +σ3CapExpendituremz λ          …………………….(4) 
Where, EXPmz  = Foreign exchange rate exposure for firm z in quarter m, Hedgemz = 0 if firm z 
didn’t hedge in quarter m and = 1 if firm z hedge in quarter m, FxSalesmz = foreign sales as ratio 





4.2 Description of hedging activity 
Since October 1994, FASB issued SFAS No. 119, Disclosure about Derivative Financial 
Instruments and Fair Value of Financial Instruments, as an interim step. In June 1998, SFAS No. 
133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, was issued. It deals with 
recognition and measurement and provides comprehensive guidance for all derivatives--even 
those instruments yet to be developed. Although not a perfect solution, the new approach of 
SFAS No.133 addresses many of the problems with previous accounting.   
Firms started reporting the derivative transactions but Compustat doesn’t have that report before 
January 2006. That is the reason why hedging data is not available before 2006. So I start the 
study period on January 1, 2006 to 31 December 2011. The sample period has 1500 days. In 
order to capture the foreign exchange rate exposure I use Kolari, Moorman and Sorescu (2008) 
method that I used in section 3.  
I obtain daily closing stock price from CRISP. The Data range from 2006 -2011. I found 
1663firms that have complete data set for 1500 days. The total number of observation in the 
study is 7,869 with matching hedge information. I use Fama-French factor daily frequency for 
the time period from WRDS. I have 1,500 observations for the study and denote it as SMB1. I 
also get HML (High Minus Low) that is the average return on the two value portfolios minus the 
average return on the two growth portfolios and denote it as HML1. I also get UMD (up minus 
down) Momentum (Up Minus Down as defined by Fama French) and denote it as UMD1. I also 
get MKTRF (or Rm-Rf)  that is the excess return on the market and denote as MKTRF1. In this 
study I take the daily trade-weighted index and calculate the daily index return FXRt 
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I use hedge data from Compustat annual update. This item is the after-tax amount of unrealized 
gain/loss on derivative transactions or cash flow hedges. This item includes: 1)Unrealized gains 
or losses on derivatives, 2) Unrealized gains or losses on cash flow hedges, 3) A hedge of a 
foreign currency exposure to a forecasted transaction, 4) Reclassification adjustments pertaining 
to derivatives, 5) Cumulative effect of accounting change adjustments associated with the 
adoption of SFAS #133. This item excludes: 1) Unrealized gains or losses on marketable 
securities or available-for-sale securities 3) Reclassification adjustments for non-derivatives 4) 
Hedge of a foreign currency exposure of a net investment in a foreign operation. This item 
contains a Combined Figure data code if derivative or cash flow hedge is combined with another 
component of Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income. This annual data is not available 
before 2006, so the data period is from 2006 to 2012. I carefully look in the break- down of the 
data and use the foot note to identify hedge of foreign currency. I get the hedge data in 2 steps. 
First I look for firms that have any value for unrealized gain/loss on derivative transaction or 
cash flow hedges. If the value is zero, I conclude that the firm didn’t hedge and assign 0 as the 
hedge value. If the value is not zero, I look in to the footnote for that firm in that year and see the 
breakdown of the value. If I see that there is any report on “A hedge of a foreign currency 
exposure to a forecast transaction” I conclude that the firm has hedged in that year and assign the 
hedge value of 1, if I see that the value for “A hedge of a foreign currency exposure to a forecast 
transaction” is not reported or zero, I also conclude that the firm didn’t hedge in that year.  
During the sample period I have 1663 firms totaling 7869 observations. This observations 
represent firms having foreign exchange rate exposure hedging information in a given year. Most 
previous study like Mian (1996), Jin and Jorion (2006), Aretz, Bartam and Dufey (2007) use 
survey data to find whether firm hedge or do not hedge. Mian (1996) finds that out of the 771 
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firms classified as hedgers, 543 firms disclose information in their annual reports on their 
hedging activities; the remaining 228 firms report use of derivatives but no information on 
hedging activities. Campbel (2010) use after-tax amount of unrealized gain/loss on derivative 
transaction or cash flow hedge to determine whether a firm hedge or not. 
[Insert table 5] 
I have 5174 observations where firms don’t hedge against foreign exchange risk and I have 2695 
observation where firms hedge against foreign exchange risk. Table 5 reports the summary 
statistics of hedge information.  The all firm mean foreign exchange rate exposure is -.104, with 
standard deviation of 2.29, maximum of 98.35 and minimum of -141.63, whereas firms that do 
hedge has a mean of -.096 with standard deviation of .48, maximum of 2.5 and minimum of –4.4 
and firms that do not hedge has a mean foreign exchange rate exposure of -.109, with standard 
deviation of 2.29, maximum of 98.35 and minimum of -141.63. 
For Robustness check I also use Gains and loss from imperfect hedging from Compustat. As 
Wilosn and Rasch (1998) argue it is not possible to have a perfect hedge. So having gains and 
loss from hedging means that firm was engaged in hedging activity. And I will use it as a binary 
variable. If the firms have any gains and loss then I will assign 1 and if the firm doesn’t have any 
gains or loss from hedging activity then I will assign 0 as the value. I denote this variable ash 
Hedge.  
I obtain segment data from CRSP through WRDS to find out total sales coming from foreign 
operations. Segment data provides geographic segment sales data, so from this segment I find the 
yearly foreign sales data for the 1663 firms from 2006 to 2011. In order to standardize the sales 
figure following Perfect and Howton (2000) I divide the total yearly foreign sales for a firm with 
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Total Asset of that year. The all firm mean foreign sales to Total Asset ratio is .37874, with 
standard deviation of .28, maximum of 4.469 and minimum of -.00153, whereas firms that do 
hedge has a mean of .38 with standard deviation of .234, maximum of 3.04 and minimum of –0 
and firms that do not hedge has a mean foreign sales to Total Asset ratio of .376, with standard 
deviation of .303, maximum of 4.469 and minimum of -.00153 
As suggested by Graham and Harvey (2001) I also use capital expenditure for firms during 2006 
to 2011. And standardize the capital expenditure by dividing it with total asset of that year. The 
all firm mean capital expenditure to total asset ratio is .1795, with standard deviation of 10.5 
maximum of 906.07 and minimum of 0, whereas firms that do hedge has a mean of 0.019 with 
standard deviation of .84, maximum of 43.87 and minimum of 0 and firms that do not hedge has 
a mean capital expenditure to total asset ratio of 0.26, with standard deviation of 12.98 maximum 
of 906.07 and minimum of 0. 
4.3 Empirical finding 
From equation 4 I primarily obtain the yearly exchange rate exposure which will be captured in 
γ5 kp . For each 1663 firm γ5 kp This operation is performed on the entire data set of 12,664,108 
observation. The algorithm was carefully designed to capture foreign exchange rate exposure for 
all firms in all of 6 years from 2006 to 2011. To achieve that I perform 11,845 regression and 
obtain as many coefficients that represent foreign exchange rate exposure for a particular firm in 
a particular year. After capturing the yearly foreign exchange exposure I match the hedge data 
(unrealized gain/loss from derivative or cash flow hedge) from Compustat and historic segment 
data from Compustat. The Compustat hedge and historical segment data were limited, so the 
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matching firm/year allowed us to work with 7869 yearly risk exposure for all the firms, hedge 
information and foreign sales information in the study.  
[Insert Table 6] 
Using this 7869 observation I try to establish the relationship between hedge and risk exposure 
following Wilosn and Rasch (1998). The result of the regression is reported in table 6. The 
coefficient for hedge is -.4164 and T-stat is -1.819. This result is statistically significant at 7.6% 
confidence level. The result shows that foreign sales are statistically insignificant with a 
coefficient of 0.0078 and T-stat of .015. Capital expenditure has a coefficient of 2.3246 with T-
statistics of 0.2953 which is statistically insignificant. I have 2695 observation where firm hedge 
and 5174 observations where firms don’t hedge. That means 34.25% of the time all firms hedge. 
I observe the negative sign for the coefficient of hedge which denotes that the firms that hedge 
has lower foreign exchange exposure compared to firms that do not hedge. The finding is 
consistent with the finding of Wilosn and Rasch (1998). 
Jin and Jorion (2006) use Q ratio – a proxy similar to Tobin’s Q to measure firm value in relation 
to hedging and examines stock return sensitivity to hedging by observing monthly stock return 
for firm during the period of 1999-2002 for 119 oil and gas companies. Jin and Jorion (2006) 
obtains hedge data from “Market Risk Disclosure” data. Jin and Jorion(2006)  find that out of 
330 firm year, 174 report hedging activity and hedging help reduce the riskiness of the firm, i.e. 
Jin and Jorion (2006) found negative beta. Our study is consistent with the findings of Jin and 
Jorion (2006). Our study has lot more comprehensive data set. 7869 firm year compared to 300 
firm year and I report 2695 hedging compared to 174 hedging report by Jin and Jorion (2006). I 
observe negative beta which means hedging helps reduce foreign exchange rate risk.  Aretz, 
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Bartram and Dufey (2007) find rational of corporate hedging as it reduces overall risk and help 
increase value of the firm. Our observation is very consistent with Aretz, Bartram and Dufey 
(2007) as I found negative coefficient for hedge which shows that hedging help reduce risk. 
Gande, Schenzler and Senbet (2009) find that foreign sales affect valuation of the firm by 
reducing overall risk through diversification. In our study I don’t find any evidence of foreign 
sales reducing foreign exchange rate exposure. There can be few explanations for that. Foreign 
sales may not be the only determinant for foreign currency exposure for manufacturing firms in 
US. There are a lot more transaction than sales that might be exposed to foreign exchange rate 
like purchasing of raw material, outsourcing and so on. This is an avenue to look in details for 
future research. 
Graham and Harvey (2001) looks into capital expenditure for 392 firms with complete survey 
result and finds that CFOs make capital expenditure decision based on number of factors and 
reducing degree of financial leverage is one factor. In our study I didn’t find capital expenditure 
to have any impact on foreign exchange rate risk. 
5.0 Conclusion 
In this study I comprehensively examined all the manufacturing firms and found that the firms 
with extreme risk exposure exhibit lower daily return and firms with moderate foreign exchange 
exposure exhibit higher daily return. I found that the risk exposure measure is highly significant 
in explaining returns using various models. The findings will be helpful in understanding 
international financial management for US manufacturing firms. The fact that I  use income 
statement data called after tax unrealized gain/loss on derivative transaction and cash flow 
hedges and look at the break down to determine if a firm hedged in a particular year will open 
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door for future research on hedging without the use of survey data. I also found that firms that 
hedge have lower foreign exchange return compared to firms that do not hedge. I did robustness 
check using alternative measurement of hedge which is gain/loss from hedging activity and 




















Table 1: Summary statistics of variables used in determining foreign exchange exposure 
                
  Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
MKTRF 
    
0.000299  




   
0.090000  




   
10.206270  
HML 
    
0.000148  




   
0.030000  
   
0.000030  
    
0.054973  
     
4.346490  
SMB 
    
0.000042  




   
0.040000  




     
2.823110  
UMD 
    
0.000303  




   
0.070000  













   
0.020000  




     
2.075380  
This table reports the mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness and Kurtosis of 
the variables used in equation used to determine exchange rate exposure. SMB (Small Minus 
Big) is the average return on the three small portfolios minus the average return on the three big 
portfolios. HML (High Minus Low) is the average return on the two value portfolios minus the 
average return on the two growth portfolios. UMD (up minus down) Momentum (Up Minus 
Down as defined by Fama French) and FXRt is the daily trade weighted index return. I obtain 
the Famma-French factor data from Kenneth French's web site at Dartmouth through WRDS 
(Wharton Research Data Service) and obtain the trade weighted broad currency Index from 











Table 2: Year by year all firm return breakdowns from 1992 to 2011 
Year Mean of RET #of observation #of firms FxExposure 
1992       0.00122  589432 2769          0.05877  
1993       0.00138  621675 2950          0.02481  
1994       0.00047  672528 3108          0.01208  
1995       0.00156  706148 3256          0.01692  
1996       0.00100  757939 3427       (0.01734) 
1997       0.00084  787639 3510          0.02118  
1998       0.00021  767871 3455          0.07452  
1999       0.00179  714739 3273          0.02500  
2000       0.00057  686418 3187       (0.01896) 
2001       0.00132  621066 2943       (0.11701) 
2002     (0.00015) 603922 2640          0.00722  
2003       0.00260  547250 2468       (0.00456) 
2004       0.00063  525044 2407       (0.03472) 
2005       0.00021  519626 2387       (0.01387) 
2006       0.00052  512424 2391       (0.08189) 
2007     (0.00001) 502081 2304       (0.05230) 
2008     (0.00190) 495068 2142       (0.16846) 
2009       0.00322  444791 1996       (0.07872) 
2010       0.00114  411342 1877       (0.13476) 
2011     (0.00051) 398825 1820       (0.09472) 
Grand 
Average 0.0008052     -0.02884109 
This Table reports all firm daily average return, number of observation, number of firm during 
the period, and average foreign exchange exposure during the period on yearly basis. The yearly 
foreign exchange rate exposure is captured using β 5 equation 1 Rjt = αj+ β1jk (MKTRFt) + β 2 jk 
SMBt + β 3 jk HMLt + β 4 jk UMDt + β 5 jk FXRXt + εjt  I obtain the daily Ret (return) data from 
CRSP(The Center for Research in Security Prices) stock/security file accessed through WRDS 







Table 3: Portfolio Regression output 
Portfolio Eqation Portfolio Exposure Tstat 
1 
Rjt = αj+ β1jk (MKTRFt) + β 2 jk SMBt + β 3 jk HMLt + β 4 jk UMDt + 
β 5 jk FXRXt + εjt  -7.04709 -2.55393 
 
Rjt = αj+ β  jk FXRXt + εjt  -7.18546 -2.87601 
2 
Rjt = αj+ β1jk (MKTRFt) + β 2 jk SMBt + β 3 jk HMLt + β 4 jk UMDt + 
β 5 jk FXRXt + εjt  -1.11591 -0.99583 
 
Rjt = αj+ β  jk FXRXt + εjt  -0.76402 -0.69402 
3 
Rjt = αj+ β1jk (MKTRFt) + β 2 jk SMBt + β 3 jk HMLt + β 4 jk UMDt + 
β 5 jk FXRXt + εjt  -0.72215 -0.62593 
 
Rjt = αj+ β  jk FXRXt + εjt  -0.52404 -0.46841 
4 
Rjt = αj+ β1jk (MKTRFt) + β 2 jk SMBt + β 3 jk HMLt + β 4 jk UMDt + 
β 5 jk FXRXt + εjt  -0.54377 -0.32072 
 
Rjt = αj+ β  jk FXRXt + εjt  -0.011078 -0.0066133 
5 
Rjt = αj+ β1jk (MKTRFt) + β 2 jk SMBt + β 3 jk HMLt + β 4 jk UMDt + 
β 5 jk FXRXt + εjt  -0.4386 -1.10347 
 
Rjt = αj+ β  jk FXRXt + εjt  -0.66432 -1.737 
6 
Rjt = αj+ β1jk (MKTRFt) + β 2 jk SMBt + β 3 jk HMLt + β 4 jk UMDt + 
β 5 jk FXRXt + εjt  -0.34469 -2.2909 
 
Rjt = αj+ β  jk FXRXt + εjt  -0.29625 -1.9845 
7 
Rjt = αj+ β1jk (MKTRFt) + β 2 jk SMBt + β 3 jk HMLt + β 4 jk UMDt + 
β 5 jk FXRXt + εjt  -0.27298 -1.6835 
 
Rjt = αj+ β  jk FXRXt + εjt  -0.33566 -2.08305 
8 
Rjt = αj+ β1jk (MKTRFt) + β 2 jk SMBt + β 3 jk HMLt + β 4 jk UMDt + 
β 5 jk FXRXt + εjt  -0.21583 -0.74592 
 
Rjt = αj+ β  jk FXRXt + εjt  -0.093864 -0.32214 
9 
Rjt = αj+ β1jk (MKTRFt) + β 2 jk SMBt + β 3 jk HMLt + β 4 jk UMDt + 
β 5 jk FXRXt + εjt  -0.17037 -2.32821 
 
Rjt = αj+ β  jk FXRXt + εjt  -0.383 -4.97638 
10 
Rjt = αj+ β1jk (MKTRFt) + β 2 jk SMBt + β 3 jk HMLt + β 4 jk UMDt + 
β 5 jk FXRXt + εjt  -0.12941 -0.86737 
 
Rjt = αj+ β  jk FXRXt + εjt  -0.15863 -0.99438 
11 
Rjt = αj+ β1jk (MKTRFt) + β 2 jk SMBt + β 3 jk HMLt + β 4 jk UMDt + 
β 5 jk FXRXt + εjt  -0.089706 -0.5554 
 
Rjt = αj+ β  jk FXRXt + εjt  -0.16156 -1.00962 
12 
Rjt = αj+ β1jk (MKTRFt) + β 2 jk SMBt + β 3 jk HMLt + β 4 jk UMDt + 
β 5 jk FXRXt + εjt  -0.055943 -0.19408 
 
Rjt = αj+ β  jk FXRXt + εjt  0.19155 0.65187 
13 
Rjt = αj+ β1jk (MKTRFt) + β 2 jk SMBt + β 3 jk HMLt + β 4 jk UMDt + 
β 5 jk FXRXt + εjt  0.015373 0.02878 









Rjt = αj+ β1jk (MKTRFt) + β 2 jk SMBt + β 3 jk HMLt + β 4 jk UMDt + 
β 5 jk FXRXt + εjt  -0.00077 -0.01713 
 
Rjt = αj+ β  jk FXRXt + εjt  -0.22808 -4.15494 
15 
Rjt = αj+ β1jk (MKTRFt) + β 2 jk SMBt + β 3 jk HMLt + β 4 jk UMDt + 
β 5 jk FXRXt + εjt  0.025023 0.19009 
 
Rjt = αj+ β  jk FXRXt + εjt  -0.05161 -0.39399 
16 
Rjt = αj+ β1jk (MKTRFt) + β 2 jk SMBt + β 3 jk HMLt + β 4 jk UMDt + 
β 5 jk FXRXt + εjt  0.050357 0.48228 
 
Rjt = αj+ β  jk FXRXt + εjt  0.20654 1.86322 
17 
Rjt = αj+ β1jk (MKTRFt) + β 2 jk SMBt + β 3 jk HMLt + β 4 jk UMDt + 
β 5 jk FXRXt + εjt  0.24676 0.6327 
 
Rjt = αj+ β  jk FXRXt + εjt  -0.05668 -0.14681 
18 
Rjt = αj+ β1jk (MKTRFt) + β 2 jk SMBt + β 3 jk HMLt + β 4 jk UMDt + 
β 5 jk FXRXt + εjt  0.11068 1.10663 
 
Rjt = αj+ β  jk FXRXt + εjt  0.16218 1.60173 
19 
Rjt = αj+ β1jk (MKTRFt) + β 2 jk SMBt + β 3 jk HMLt + β 4 jk UMDt + 
β 5 jk FXRXt + εjt  0.14596 1.18411 
 
Rjt = αj+ β  jk FXRXt + εjt  0.21252 1.68781 
20 
Rjt = αj+ β1jk (MKTRFt) + β 2 jk SMBt + β 3 jk HMLt + β 4 jk UMDt + 
β 5 jk FXRXt + εjt  0.18881 1.26083 
 
Rjt = αj+ β  jk FXRXt + εjt  0.3514 2.28101 
21 
Rjt = αj+ β1jk (MKTRFt) + β 2 jk SMBt + β 3 jk HMLt + β 4 jk UMDt + 
β 5 jk FXRXt + εjt  0.24524 2.2583 
 
Rjt = αj+ β  jk FXRXt + εjt  -0.2879 -2.39743 
22 
Rjt = αj+ β1jk (MKTRFt) + β 2 jk SMBt + β 3 jk HMLt + β 4 jk UMDt + 
β 5 jk FXRXt + εjt  0.31808 0.75832 
 
Rjt = αj+ β  jk FXRXt + εjt  0.27356 0.65334 
23 
Rjt = αj+ β1jk (MKTRFt) + β 2 jk SMBt + β 3 jk HMLt + β 4 jk UMDt + 
β 5 jk FXRXt + εjt  0.4393 2.50678 
 
Rjt = αj+ β  jk FXRXt + εjt  0.53838 3.06479 
24 
Rjt = αj+ β1jk (MKTRFt) + β 2 jk SMBt + β 3 jk HMLt + β 4 jk UMDt + 
β 5 jk FXRXt + εjt  0.3991 1.72792 
 
Rjt = αj+ β  jk FXRXt + εjt  0.41452 1.80136 
25 
Rjt = αj+ β1jk (MKTRFt) + β 2 jk SMBt + β 3 jk HMLt + β 4 jk UMDt + 
β 5 jk FXRXt + εjt  1.03369 2.36866 
  Rjt = αj+ β  jk FXRXt + εjt  1.10592 2.53483 
This table reports the coefficient of foreign exchange rate exposure and T-statistics based on 
portfolio constructed based on ranking of foreign exchange rate exposure coefficient. Each of the 
25 portfolios have 243 firms 
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Table 4: Portfolio risk exposure and Portfolio return  
Portfolio Portfolio Return Portfolio Exposure Tstat 
1              (0.000111)                    (7.047090)   (2.553930) 
2                 0.000391                     (1.115910)   (0.995830) 
3                 0.000463                     (0.722150)   (0.625930) 
4                 0.000316                     (0.543770)   (0.320720) 
5                 0.000314                     (0.438600)   (1.103470) 
6                 0.000595                     (0.344690)   (2.290900) 
7                 0.000547                     (0.272980)   (1.683500) 
8                 0.000512                     (0.215830)   (0.745920) 
9                 0.000716                     (0.170370)   (2.328210) 
10                 0.001036                     (0.129410)   (0.867370) 
11                 0.001176                     (0.089706)   (0.555400) 
12                 0.002136                     (0.055943)   (0.194080) 
13                 0.001873                       0.015373      0.028780  
14                 0.001934                     (0.000772)   (0.017128) 
15                 0.001930                       0.025023      0.190090  
16                 0.001676                       0.050357      0.482280  
17                 0.001218                       0.246760      0.632700  
18                 0.001003                       0.110680      1.106630  
19                 0.001049                       0.145960      1.184110  
20                 0.000755                       0.188810      1.260830  
21                 0.000717                       0.245240      2.258300  
22                 0.000705                       0.318080      0.758320  
23                 0.000691                       0.439300      2.506780  
24                 0.000236                       0.399100      1.727920  
25              (0.000112)                      1.033690      2.368660  
This table reports the portfolio Return and portfolio exposure that shows the inverse “U” relationship 









Table 5: Summary statistics of variables used for Hedge analysis 
  #of observation   Mean Std Dev Min Max Skew Kurtosis 
    FXEXPOSURE -0.10498 2.29662 -141.632 98.35926 -20.8002 2347.95 
All 
Firm 7869 HEDGE 0.34248 0.47457 0 1 0.664 -1.5595 
1663 
 
FXSALES 0.37874 0.28209 -0.00153 4.4692 2.51805 14.7455 
    CAPEXP 0.1795 10.53911 0 906.0769 81.75752 6959.557 
                  
Firms 
 
FXEXPOSURE -0.10946 2.81053 -141.632 98.35926 -17.2578 1591.81 
That do 5174 HEDGE 0 0 0 0 
  not 
Hedge 
 
FXSALES 0.37617 0.30381 -0.00153 4.4692 2.60125 14.5927 
    CAPEXP 0.26283 12.9825 0 906.0769 66.5067 4596.13 
                  
Firms 
 
FXEXPOSURE -0.09639 0.48637 -4.40401 2.53129 -0.72137 6.2301 
That do 2695 HEDGE 1 0 1 1 
   Hedge 
 
FXSALES 0.38368 0.2348 0 3.0447 1.9772 10.6388 
    CAPEXP 0.01949 0.84543 0 43.8768 51.8593 2691.20 
This table reports mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness and Kurtosis for variables 
used in  equation  broken down by whether firms hedged or did not hedge in that particular year. I obtain 
hedge and capital expenditure data from Standard & Poor's Compustat. I obtain foreign sales from 











Table 6:  Regression result from hedge analysis 
  Estimated Standard     
Variable Coefficient Error t-statistic P-value 
C 0.3833 0.3649 1.0503 [.294] 
HEDGE -0.4164 0.2289 -1.8190 [.076] 
Percentage of foreign sales 0.0078 0.4974 0.0157 [.987] 
Capital Expenditure 2.3246 7.8719 0.2953 [.768] 
This table reports regression from equation  EXPmz  =θ + σ1Hedgemz + σ2FxSalesmz 
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Effect of Executive Compensation on Exchange Rate Risk in US 
Manufacturing Industry  
1.0 Introduction 
Executive compensation attracts considerable interest from the public, scholars and policy 
makers. Executive compensation packages worth millions of dollars make the news headlines. 
The broader issue of ‘‘stake-holder capitalism’’ versus ‘‘share-holder capitalism’’ in the recent 
policy debate deals with, among other issues, the responsibility of executives with respect to 
outside parties.  
A large theoretical and empirical literature has investigated executive compensation, often using 
an agency framework. In particular, executives are viewed as agents of shareholders, who hire 
them to run firms. As executives are typically better informed about firm conditions than 
shareholders, a potential conflict of interest arises. Agency theory offers several predictions that 
have been widely tested by an extensive and growing body of empirical research. The interests of 
the shareholders and the executives can be partly aligned by making executive compensation 
dependent on observable measures of firm’s performance. Numerous studies support the 
presence of such a relationship but find that the sensitivity of pay to stock returns is fairly low. A 
stronger relationship is commonly found between top executive pay and firm size. The idea here 
is that if there are complementarities between individual talent and the productivity of control, it 
is efficient to assign greater control to more talented people. Thus a competitive market allocates 
talented people to higher level positions in larger firms. Incentives in an organization can be 
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provided not only by linking pay to performance but also by vertical mobility from less to more 
rewarding jobs. When the firm has a hierarchical structure and organizes jobs into career ladders, 
career concerns and the probability of promotion are powerful incentive devices. The presence of 
career concerns implies that, because at the top of the hierarchy there are no further possibilities 
of promotion, alternative incentive schemes such as pay for performance should be stronger for 
top executives and in general for managers close to retirement. According to Holmstrom (1979) 
agency theory also predicts that executive pay should be optimally based on measures of 
performance that are as informative as possible. This provides the theoretical foundation for 
relative performance evaluation that focuses on firm performance relative to a benchmark. 
Compared to absolute performance, relative performance provides incentives and, at the same 
time, insulates managers from common sources of uncertainty that affect the firm and its 
competitors. 
Most US manufacturing firm are in the business of either importing raw materials from foreign 
countries or exporting finished good to foreign countries. Some manufacturing firms are engaged 
in both importing and exporting. So there is always an inherent foreign exchange exposure for 
US manufacturing firms. There has been considerable amount of study like Frobes (2002) that 
examines impact of major depreciation on firm performance. Kolari, Moormna and Sorescu 
(2008) found portfolios with extreme exchange rate risk has significantly lower return compared 
to portfolios that are not having extreme exchange rate risks. He and NG (1998) find exchange 




On the other hand corporate governance is getting lot of attention from researchers. Coles, 
Daniel and Naveen (2006) provide empirical evidence of a strong causal relationship between 
managerial compensation and investment policy, debt policy and firm risk. Chen, Steiner and 
Whyte (2006) investigates the relationship between option-based executive compensation and 
market measures of risk and finds structure of executive compensation induces risk taking. 
Dong, Wang and Xie (2010) examine whether stock options can induce excessive risk taking by 
managers in firms security issue decisions and find that stock option sometimes make managers 
take on too much risk and in the process pursue suboptimal capital structure policies. 
However, there haven’t been many studies that tried to capture the relationship between 
executive compensation and foreign exchange rate risk. In this paper I try to explore that area 
and address the issue of foreign exchange rate exposure and executive compensation. 
The core concept of this study goes back to the classical study of agency theory. The executives 
are the agents taking care of the business on behalf of the shareholders. If the executives are well 
compensated then it is expected that the executives should take good care of the business. Taking 
good care of business ultimately translates into maximizing share holders’ wealth. In an effort to 
align the wellbeing of share holders’ wealth with executives’ wealth, stock options are given to 
the executives. When the stock options given to an executive become vested or exercisable but 
the executive doesn’t exercise it, his wealth becomes tied to the value of stock. According to 
Ross (2004) this makes the executive like an equity holder instead of a debt holder. And as an 
equity holder an executive will prefer to take higher risk because it will yield higher expected 
return as opposed to a debt holder who would prefer low risk and low return. Among a lot of 
other risk that a business needs to manage, foreign exchange rate exposure is a critical one for 
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manufacturing industries. Consequently, the value of executive stock option is expected to be 
instrumental in reducing foreign exchange rate risk.  
Wallenstein (2000), Martin (2009) looks into risk taking behavior of executives and explores 
demographic attributes like gender and age. Their findings support the argument that male 
executives and CEOs are more risk taking in their decision making than their female counterpart. 
They also find that younger CEO’s and executives’ exhibit more risky decision making trait 
compared their older counter part.  That is why in this paper I also investigate if age and gender 
has any impact on foreign exchange rate exposure. 
In this paper I explore manufacturing industry of US. I capture the foreign exchange rate 
exposure using methodology used by Vassalou (2000) and Kolari, Moormna and Sorescu (2008) 
and then use that foreign exchange rate exposure to find if executive compensation, age, and 
gender have any impact on foreign rate exposure. The findings are consistent with Rajgopal and  
Shevlin (2002), and Chen, Steiner and Whyte (2006). I find the value of in-the-money 
unexercised vested and unvested executive stock option is statistically significant in determining 
firm’s exchange rate exposure. 
2.0 Executive Compensation in United States 
In 1996 the average CEO of S&P 500 manufacturing companies owned less than 1% of company 
shares, while median ownership was only 0.11%. There is no contract that would perfectly align 
the interests of managers and shareholders.  The optimal contract is therefore the one that 
minimizes agency costs, that is, the sum of contracting, monitoring, other expenditures made in 
achieving a certain level of compliance with the principal’s interest and the costs of the residual 
divergence. Under the optimal contracting view, this is exactly what executive compensation 
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packages are designed to do.  The board, attempting to maximize shareholder wealth, seeks to 
establish optimal incentives for the executives. This view is captured in various formal models 
that view the board of directors as selecting an optimal compensation program for shareholders. 
As I will discuss, a great deal of empirical work has been done from this perspective.  
The designer attempting to optimize an executive compensation program would be concerned 
with (1) attracting and retaining high quality executives, (2) providing executives with incentives 
to behave in the shareholders’ interest both by exerting effort and by making decisions that will 
serve those interests, and (3) minimizing overall costs.   
A successful CEO of a large public company undoubtedly possesses a rare combination of skills 
and instincts.  The CEO must manage an organization with thousands of employees, provide the 
strategic direction for the firm, and decide when or whether the company should absorb other 
firms or be absorbed.  Individuals who possess the necessary attributes may be scarce, and 
competition among firms, particularly for rising stars, may be intense.  Of course, compensation 
is not the only factor in attracting and retaining talent at the very top of the corporate pyramid, 
but it is an important one.   
To induce an executive to take and retain a position, then, a firm must offer an overall package of 
benefits that meets or exceeds the executive’s opportunity cost.  An executive’s appetite for risk 
is relevant in this regard. A firm that requires a risk-averse executive to accept risky elements of 
compensation will have to provide more total compensation on an expected value basis to offset 
the risk-bearing costs.  Under the optimal-contracting view, inducing the executive to take and 
retain a position only provides a lower bound on compensation.  A firm should not attempt to 
pay less than the executive’s reservation wage, but it may pay more in order to provide desirable 
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incentives.  If the firm does exceed the reservation wage in order to optimize incentives, 
providing those incentives through risky compensation devices should not present a problem to 
the executive. 
There are two dimensions to the executive incentive problem. A firm must provide incentives 
that induce the executive to expend effort as well as incentives that motivate the executive to 
take shareholder-regarding decisions.   As in any agency relationship, there is the risk that the 
agent may expend too little effort on the principal’s behalf.   That is, executives may have an 
incentive to work less than is optimal for shareholders as a group. This distortion arises because 
executives enjoy all of the benefits of their leisure time (or other non-work activities) but capture 
only a fraction of the value their work generates for the firm.   
The second agency problem in most public companies rests in the possibility that executives will 
make decisions that maximize their own utility but that fail to maximize shareholder value.  Such 
decisions might include the erection of lavish skyscraping office buildings to house corporate 
headquarters staff or other excessive perquisite consumption; the selection of low risk business 
strategies; attempts to block value-adding takeover attempts; or the failure to reorganize and 
reduce the scope of operations when that is called for.  The variety of critical decisions that may 
be faced by a CEO is extremely large, and the compensation device that properly aligns 
incentives in one case may be less effective in another.  Moreover, the nature of the truly key 
decisions in the coming years often will be unforeseeable, thus complicating further the design of 
the optimal compensation plan.    
The reservation wage places a lower bound on executive compensation, but a firm may wish to 
pay executives much more than the reservation wage to incentivize behavior that adds 
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shareholder value.  Under the optimal contracting view, shareholders should continue to give 
value to executives until the incremental cost of doing so outweighs the value of the incremental 
productivity achieved.  Optimizing incentives probably will not require transferring a substantial 
fraction of firm value to the executives, however.    As I will discuss below, creating desirable 
incentives is less a matter of the fraction of value transferred to the executives than the manner  
In which value is transferred. A compensation plan designer attempting to maximize shareholder 
value would take all of the incentive effects into account and would then optimize the  mix based 
upon a forecast of the business environment over the plan period. Although the specifics of the 
optimal executive compensation program will vary according to the circumstances,  I can make 
certain general predictions about these contracts.  First, variable pay schemes, such as bonus and 
stock options programs, will be adopted for performance sensitivity and will thereby shape the 
individual executive’s incentives.  
Second, compensation devices will be selected and combined in a manner that attempts to 
balance incentive generation with the individual executive’s appetite for risk.   Third, optimal 
executive pay might well exceed the reservation wage in order to provide the incentives 
discussed above. 
Executive stock option pay rose dramatically in the United States after scholarly support from 
Professors Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy. Due to their publications in the Harvard 
Business Review 1990 and support from Wall Street and institutional investors, Congress passed 
a law making it cost effective to pay executives in equity. 
Supporters of stock options say they align the interests of CEOs to those of shareholders, since 
options are valuable only if the stock price remains above the option's strike price. Stock options 
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are now counted as a corporate expense (non-cash), which impacts a company's income 
statement and makes the distribution of options more transparent to shareholders. Critics of stock 
options charge that they are granted without justification as there is little reason to align the 
interests of CEOs with those of shareholders Empirical evidence shows since the wide use of 
stock options, executive pay relative to workers has dramatically risen. Moreover, executive 
stock options contributed to the accounting manipulation scandals of the late 1990s and abuses 
such as the options backdating of such grants. Finally, researchers have shown that relationships 
between executive stock options and stock buybacks, implying that executives use corporate 
resources to inflate stock prices before they exercise their options. 
Stock options also incentivize executives to engage in risk-seeking behavior. This is because the 
value of a call option increases with increased volatility. Stock options also present a potential 
up-side gain (if the stock price goes up) for the executive, but no downside risk (if the stock price 
goes down, the option simply isn't exercised). Stock options therefore can incentivize excessive 
risk seeking behavior that can lead to catastrophic corporate failure. If they are short-term 
vesting, they can also incentivize short-term. 
In the Financial crisis of 2007-2009 in the United States, pressure mounted to use more stock 
options than cash in executive pay. However, since many then-proportionally larger 2008 
bonuses were awarded in February, 2009, near the March, 2009, bottom of the stock market, 
many of the bonuses in the banking industry turned out to have doubled or more in paper value 
by late in 2009. The bonuses were under particular scrutiny, including by the United States 
Treasury’s new special master of pay, Kenneth R. Feinberg, because many of the firms had been 
rescued by government Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and other funds. 
52 
 
3.0 Literature Review 
Most of the models of executive pay have been developed to fit the reality of Anglo-Saxon 
capitalism, where stringent disclosure rules make data on top executives’ compensation readily 
available, and less is known about executive pay outside these two countries. Managerial 
compensation, recruiting, promotion and firing are essential components of the broader 
mechanism of corporate governance. An effective mechanism of corporate governance relies on 
some combination of monitoring by large shareholders and of adequate legal protection of 
minority investors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1996).  
Jensen and Murphy (1990) find the CEO wealth changes $3.25 for every $1,000 change in 
shareholder wealth. They also find that salary and bonus (as opposed to wealth) changes only 
2.2¢ per $1,000 change in shareholder wealth, and total pay2 changes by about 3.3¢ per $1,000 
change in shareholder wealth. They suggest that this link between pay and performance, while 
statistically significant, is too weak to provide proper incentives to the CEO. The link is 
economically insignificant, they argue, because CEO compensation is constrained by political 
forces. 
Lippert (1996) present a theoretical model of the agency conflict between managers and 
shareholders. Lippert (1996) examine the problem in an expected-utility-maximization scenario 
in which the explicit cost of the agency conflict that arises between the manager and 
shareholders is derived. Lippert (1996) determines the effect of changes in firm variance on 
various compensation components. Lippert (1996) recognize that an individual firm’s propensity 
for variance is firm specific and that the manager has limited control over the risk of the firm’s 
future cash flows. Lippert (1996) show the ability of the manager to affect the variance of the 
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firm’s future cash flows be an important characteristic in the development of an effective 
incentive compensation package.  
Carpenter (2000) solves the dynamic investment problem of a risk adverse manager compensated 
with a call option on the assets he controls. Under the manager’s optimal policy, the option ends 
up either deep in or deep out of the money. As the asset value goes to zero, volatility goes to 
infinity. Carpenter (2000) find that the option compensation does not strictly lead to greater risk 
seeking. Sometimes, the manager’s optimal volatility is less with the option than it would be if 
he were trading his own account. Carpenter (2000) conclude giving the manager more options 
causes him to reduce volatility 
Brunello, Graziano and Parigi (2001) use survey data to investigate the determinants of executive 
pay in a sample of Italian firms. Brunello, Graziano and Parigi (2001) has hypothesis that the 
characteristics of the Italian capital market, corporate governance and the specific relationship 
between banks and firms imply a low fraction of incentive pay over total compensation and a 
low sensitivity of incentive pay to firm performance. Brunello, Graziano and Parigi (2001) find 
evidence that supports this hypothesis. Brunello, Graziano and Parigi (2001)  estimate that an 
increase of real profits per firm by 1 billion lire increases the pay of upper and middle managers 
by only 31 thousand lire, more than the increase found for lower management (6 thousand). 
Brunello, Graziano and Parigi (2001) also find pay–performance sensitivity is higher in foreign-
owned firms, in listed firms, and in firms affiliated to a multinational group. Brunello, Graziano 
and Parigi (2001) use survey data of executive compensation by an international consultation 
firm between 1993 -1996. 
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Rajgopal and  Shevlin (2002) examine whether executive stock options (ESOs) provide 
managers with incentives to invest in risky projects. Rajgopal and  Shevlin (2002) examine 
whether the coefficient of variation of future cash flows from exploration activity  increases with 
the sensitivity of the value of the CEO’s options to stock return volatility (ESO risk incentives). 
Rajgopal and  Shevlin (2002) uses both ESO risk incentives and exploration risk and treat them 
as endogenous variables by adopting a simultaneous equations approach. Rajgopal and  Shevlin 
(2002) find evidence that ESO risk incentives has a positive relation with future exploration risk 
taking. Rajgopal and  Shevlin (2002) also indicate that ESO risk incentives exhibits a negative 
relation with oil price hedging in a system of equations where ESO risk incentives and hedging 
are allowed to be endogenously determined. Rajgopal and  Shevlin (2002) concludes that the 
results are consistent with ESOs providing managers with incentives to mitigate risk-related 
incentive problems.  
Ross (2004) find that simple, intuitive, necessary and sufficient condition under which incentive 
schedules make agents more or less risk averse. Ross (2004) explore the duality between a fee 
schedule that makes an agent more or less risk averse and gamble that increase or decrease risk. 
Baker and Hall (2004) develop a model that clarifies how to measure CEO incentive strength and 
how to reconcile the enormous differences in pay sensitivities between executives in large and 
small firms. Baker and Hall (2004) show a crucial parameter to be the elasticity of CEO 
productivity with respect to firm size. Baker and Hall (2004) ﬁnd that CEO marginal products 
rise significantly with firm size. Baker and Hall (2004) confirms that CEOs of large firms have a 
“chain letter” effect on firm performance, and overall CEO incentives are roughly constant, or 
decline slightly, with ﬁrm size. Baker and Hall (2004) employ a multitask model to discuss 
implications for the design of control systems. 
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Tian (2004), using a utility-maximization framework show that the incentive to increase stock 
price does not always increase as more options are granted. Keeping the total cost of his 
compensation fixed, granting more options creates greater incentives to increase stock price only 
if optionwealth does not exceed a certain fraction of total wealth. Tian (2004) find that beyond 
this critical level, granting more options actually reduces incentive effects and becomes 
counterproductive. Tian (2004) concludes that stock options also create incentive to reduce 
(increase) idiosyncratic (systematic) risk and these incentive effects are sensitive to the choice of 
exercise price. 
Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) provide empirical evidence of a strong causal relation between 
managerial compensation and investment policy, debt policy, and firm risk. Controlling for CEO 
pay-performance sensitivity and the feedback effects of firm policy and risk on the managerial 
compensation scheme, Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) find that higher sensitivity of CEO 
wealth to stock volatility implements riskier policy choices, including relatively more investment 
in R&D, less investment in property plan and equipment (PPE), more focus, and higher leverage. 
Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) also find that riskier policy choices generally lead to 
compensation structures with higher volatility and lower Sensitivity. Coles, Daniel and Naveen 
(2006) find that Stock-return volatility has a positive effect on both volatility and Sensitivity. 
Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) use Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp database for data on CEO 
compensation for the period of 1992-2002.  
Burns and Kedia (2006) examine the effect of CEO compensation contracts on misreporting. 
Burns and Kedia (2006) find that the sensitivity of the CEO’s option portfolio to stock price is 
significantly positively related to the propensity to misreport. Burns and Kedia (2006) do not 
find that the sensitivity of other components of CEO compensation, i.e., equity, restricted stock, 
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long-term incentive payouts, and salary plus bonus have any significant impact on the propensity 
to misreport. Burns and Kedia (2006) find that relative to other components of compensation, 
stock options are associated with stronger incentives to misreport because convexity in CEO 
wealth introduced by stock options limits the downside risk on detection of the misreporting. 
Chen, Steiner and Whyte (2006) investigate the relation between option-based executive 
compensation and market measures of risk for a sample of commercial banks during the period 
of 1992–2000. Chen, Steiner and Whyte (2006) show that following deregulation; banks have 
increasingly employed stock option-based compensation. As a result, the structure of executive 
compensation induces risk-taking, and the stock of option-based wealth also induces risk-taking. 
Chen, Steiner and Whyte (2006) find that the results are robust across alternative risk measures, 
statistical methodologies, and model specifications. Chen, Steiner and Whyte (2006) results 
support a management risk-taking hypothesis over a managerial risk aversion hypothesis. Chen, 
Steiner and Whyte (2006) results have important implications for regulators in monitoring the 
risk levels of banks. Chen, Steiner and Whyte (2006) uses risk measures from CRSP and the 
control variables are obtained from ExecuComp Database. Chen, Steiner and Whyte (2006) has a 
sample size of 68 commercial bank between the period of 1995-1998. 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) provide evidence that the use of discretionary accruals to 
manipulate reported earnings is more pronounced at firms where the CEO’s potential total 
compensation is more closely tied to the value of stock and option holdings. Bergstresser and 
Philippon (2006) also find that during years of high accruals, CEOs exercise unusually large 
numbers of options and CEOs and other insiders sell large quantities of shares. 
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Sun and Emanuel (2009) examines whether the relationship between future firm performance 
and chief executive officer (CEO) stock option grants is affected by the quality of the 
compensation committee.  Sun and Emanuel (2009) measures compensation committee quality 
using six committee characteristics – the proportion of directors appointed during the tenure of 
the incumbent CEO, the proportion of directors with at least ten years ‘board services, the 
proportion of directors who are CEOs at other companies, the aggregate shareholding of 
directors on the compensation committee, the proportion of directors with three or more 
additional board seats, and compensation committee size. Sun and Emanuel (2009) find that 
future firm performance is more positively associated with stock option grants as compensation 
committee quality increases. 
Cunat and Guadalupe (2009) study the effect of product market competition on the compensation 
packages that firms offer to their executives. Cunat and Guadalupe (2009) use a panel of US 
executives in the 1990s and exploit two deregulation episodes in the banking and financial 
sectors as quasi-natural experiments. Cunat and Guadalupe (2009) provide difference-in-
differences estimates of their effect on (1) total pay, (2) estimated fixed pay and performance-
pay sensitivities, and (3) the sensitivity of stock option grants. Cunat and Guadalupe (2009) find 
results that indicate that the deregulations substantially changed the level and structure of 
compensation: the variable components of pay increased along with performance-pay 
sensitivities and, at the same time, the fixed component of pay fell. Cunat and Guadalupe (2009) 
also find that the overall effect on total pay was small. 
Dong, Wang and Xie (2010) examine whether executive stock options can induce excessive risk 
taking by managers in firms’ security issue decisions. Dong, Wang and Xie (2010) find that 
CEOs whose wealth is more sensitive to stock return volatility due to their option holdings are 
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more likely to choose debt over equity as a capital-raising vehicle. Dong, Wang and Xie (2010) 
also find the pattern holds not only in firms that are under levered relative to their optimal capital 
structure but also in over levered firms. Dong, Wang and Xie (2010) find the evidence to be 
inconsistent with executive stock options aligning the interests of managers and shareholders; 
rather, Dong, Wang and Xie (2010) find that it supports the hypothesis that stock options 
sometimes make managers take on too much risk and in the process pursue suboptimal capital 
structure policies. Dong, Wang and Xie (2010) use data from SDC for common equity and 
straight debt offering, and use ExecuComp for compensation data. The data range is for the 
period of 1993 -2007.  
Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) find that measures of board and ownership structure 
explain a significant amount of cross-sectional variation in CEO compensation, after controlling 
for standard economic determinants of pay. Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) finds that the 
signs of the coefficients on the board and ownership structure variables suggest that CEOs earn 
greater compensation when governance structures are less effective. Core, Holthausen, and 
Larcker (1999) also find that the predicted component of compensation arising from these 
characteristics of board and ownership structure has a statistically significant negative relation 
with subsequent firm operating and stock return performance. Core, Holthausen, and Larcker 
(1999) suggest that firms with weaker governance structures have greater agency problems; that 
CEOs at firms with greater agency problems receive greater compensation; and that firms with 
greater agency problems perform worse. 
Brockman, Martin and Unlu (2010) find executive compensation influences managerial risk 
preferences through executives’ portfolio sensitivities to changes in stock prices (delta) and stock 
return volatility (vega). Brockman, Martin and Unlu (2010) find that large deltas discourage 
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managerial risk-taking, while large vegas encourage risk-taking. Brockman, Martin and Unlu 
(2010) suggest that short-maturity debt mitigates agency costs of debt by constraining 
managerial risk preferences. Brockman, Martin and Unlu (2010) find evidence of a negative 
(positive) relation between CEO portfolio deltas (vegas) and short-maturity debt. Brockman, 
Martin and Unlu (2010) also find that short-maturity debt mitigates the influence of vega- and 
delta-related incentives on bond yields. Brockman, Martin and Unlu (2010) find empirical 
evidence that shows that short-term debt mitigates agency costs of debt arising from 
compensation risk. 
Florin and Hallack (2010) investigate the pay-for-performance link in executive compensation 
and document main issues in the pay-performance debate and explain practical issues in setting 
pay as well as data issues including how pay is disclosed and how that has changed over time. 
Florin and Hallack (2010) provide a summary of the state of CEO pay levels and pay mix in 
2009 using a sample of over 2,000 companies and describe main data sources for researchers. 
Florin and Hallack (2010) also investigate the root of fundamental confusion in the literature 
across disciplines – methodological issues. In exploring methodological issues, Florin and 
Hallack (2010)  focus on empirical specifications, causality, fixed-effects, first- differencing and 
instrumental variables issues. Florin and Hallack (2010) conclude by examining a series of 
research areas where further work can be done, within and across disciplines. Florin and Hallack 
(2010) use ExecuComp Data from 1992 t0 2010. 
Wallenstein (2000) argues that the statistical link between executive compensation and firm 
performance is well established. Wallenstein (2000) explore whether the relationship itself 
change depending on firm performance and find that, on average, executives are rewarded in 
good years but are not punished in bad years. Wallenstein (2000) finds that the result is 
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consistent with a model that attempts to induce risk-taking behavior by rewarding good 
performance and limiting downside punishment. Wallenstein (2000) also examines whether the 
relationship change with the executive’s rank in the company and  find that the top executive’s 
compensation is most strongly linked with performance, the second-highest ranking executive 
less so, and the third-highest even less. Wallenstein (2000) argues that the result is consistent 
with linking compensation to performance only to the extent that the employee has some direct 
influence on it. Wallenstein (2000) use ExecuComp date from 1991 -1995. 
An emergent view in financial economics argues that the relationship between the convexity of a 
manager’s compensation profile and risk-seeking behavior may not be monotonic as argued by 
Ross (2004). Therefore, a countervailing hypothesis is that executives’ holdings of vested in-the-
money options (in relation to personal wealth) should be negatively associated with a firm’s 
foreign exchange rate exposure.  Having in-the-money options may prompt an executive to 
reduce the volatility of a firm’s cash flows to prevent the options from going out of the money, in 
which case unvested in-the-money options would also be negatively correlated with interest 
rates. 
Oakley (2000) reports that only seven of the Fortune 1000 firms had a female chief executive 
officer (CEO) in 1997. In their study of corporate board members, Carter, Simkins, and Simpson 
(2003) describe the average firm in their sample gathered from the Fortune 1000 in 1997 as 
having only 1.1 women board members of 11 total board members. It also has been reported by 
Catalyst (2006), a nonprofit organization that focuses on women in business, that the average 
Fortune 500 firm in 2005 had 21.8 corporate officers and 3.6 of these positions were held by 
women. They also specify that eight Fortune 500 firms in 2005 had women CEOs, which 
represents a slight increase in female CEOs in these high profile firms. In 2006 alone, PepsiCo 
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and Archer Daniel Midland appointed female CEOs. Thus, as increases in the number of 
prominent female business leaders occur over time, attitudes toward female business leaders may 
be changing. The glass ceiling may be disappearing. 
Martin (2009) use 70 announcements of female CEO appointments over 1992-2007 and a 
matched sample of 70 male CEO appointments. Martin (2009) evaluate whether gender 
influences capital market measures of valuation and risk for CEO appointments. The three-day 
cumulative abnormal returns are not significantly different between female and male CEO 
appointments, indicating a gender bias is not reflected by the financial market. Martin (2009)  
find changes in risk following CEO appointments are significantly lower for female CEOs, 
supporting the view that the market perceives female CEOs to be relatively risk averse. Martin 
(2009) find evidence consistent with our hypothesis that firms with relatively high risk (total risk 
and idiosyncratic risk) are more likely to appoint female CEOs so that risk might decrease. 
4.0 Methodology 
In this study, first I capture the exchange rate exposure of manufacturing firms in US. And then I 
try to establish the relationship between executive compensation and foreign exchange rate 
exposure. 
I use the methodology that has been used by Dumas (1983), subsequent empirical work by Jorion 
(1990), Bodnar and Marston (2002) and Kolari, Moorman and Sorescu (2008), I measure FXRXt 
as a foreign exposure for each firm by regressing its daily stock return variables (Rjt). FXRXt 
captures the return on the US dollar per currency basket. The main approach is based on Fama-
French-Carhart (1997): 
Rjt = αj+ β1jk (MKTRFt) + β 2 jk SMBt + β 3 jk HMLt + β 4 jk UMDt + β 5 jk FXRXt + εjt  …..( 1) 
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Where, Rjt = Daily stock return for firm j in time t, MKTRFt = CRSP value-weighted index of US 
stocks minus  one-month T-bill rate in time t, SMB = return on portfolio of small stock minus the 
return on portfolio of large US stock in time t, HML = return on portfolio of high book to market 
stocks minus the return on portfolio of low book to market US stock in time t, UMD = return on 
portfolio of past winner stocks minus past loser stocks in time t. FXRXt  = Percent Change in 
Federal Reserve’s Trade weighted currency (Broad Currency) Index in time t. 
From equation 1, I capture and use foreign exchange rate exposure, which is the coefficient of 
FXRxt (β5jk) for each firm j in year k. The value of β 5 jk describes the foreign exchange rate 
exposure for the firm j in year k. The higher the value β 5 jk the higher foreign exposure the firm 
will have. This analysis will allow us to create an array of data having yearly exchange rate 
exposure for each firm in the study. And I use this exposure to establish the relationship between 
executive compensation and exchange rate risk. 
Following Sun and Emanuel (2009), Rephael, kandel and Wohl (2012), Rajgopal and  Shevlin 
(2002), Wallenstein (2000) and Chen, Steiner and Whyte (2009), I regress the coefficient of 
exchange rate risk exposure that I captured for equation 2 β5jk , I name it FXRiskjk as a 
measurement of foreign risk exposure for j firm in year k on number of independent variables 
including executives’ average total compensation for the year. I call it TotalCompensationyjk , 
this includes salary, benefits, bonus and value of stock option granted (using black-scholes). 
Following Dong, Wang and Xie (2010), Rephael, kandel and Wohl (2012) and Barns and Kedia 
(2009), I also use estimated value of in-the-money unexercised vested option as independent 
variable and call it vested stock optionjk for j firm, in year k, I also use Estimated value of in-the-
money unexercised unvested option as Unvested Stock Optionjk for firm j in year k. As a control 
variable I use the ration of male and female employee I call it MFRatiojk for the j firm in year k 
63 
 
and average executive age for firm j in year k as Agejk following Hallahan, Faff, and Mckenzie 
(2004).  
     FXRiskjk = α + β1 TotalCompnesationjk  + β2 MFRatiojk + β3 Agejk +β4 VestedStockOPtionjk 
+β5 UnEx_ExOptionsjk +υj               ………………………………………………………………..  (2) 
I use pooled OLS as well as look for fixed effect and random effect in the panel data. I ran fixed 
effect panel data and random effect panel data to see if fixed or random effect exist and check for 
consistency. The objective of the study is to look into the relationship between foreign exchange 
rate exposure and executive compensation from equation. 
5.0 Data 
The source of data in this study is Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), ExecuComp, 
Federal Reserve Bank Reports and Fama-French Portfolios and Factors. From Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP), I use CRSP/Compustat Merged Database - Security Daily 
and find daily closing price and calculate the return from it.  Initial data set has 12,665,108 
observations from January 1, 1992 to December 31, 2011. During this period I have 5,041 
working days. I choose the firms having Sic code between 2000 and 4000 that represents 
manufacturing firms. The initial data set has 6,117 firms.  
I obtain Fama-French factor daily frequency for the time period of January 1, 1992 to December 
31, 2011 from WRDS. I obtain SMB (Small Minus Big) that is the average return on the three 
small portfolios minus the average return on the three big portfolios, SMB = 1/3 (Small Value + 
Small Neutral + Small Growth) - 1/3 (Big Value + Big Neutral + Big Growth).  SMB for July of 
year t to June of t+1 include all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks for which market equity 
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data for December of t-1 and June of t, and (positive) book equity data for t-1, exists. I have 
5,041 observations for the study and denote it as SMB. I also obtain HML (High Minus Low) 
that is the average return on the two value portfolios minus the average return on the two growth 
portfolios, HML =  1/2 (Small Value + Big Value) - 1/2 (Small Growth + Big Growth). HML for 
July of year t to June of t+1 include all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks for which market 
equity data for December of t-1 and June of t, and (positive) book equity data for t-1, exist. I also 
obtain UMD (up minus down) Momentum (Up Minus Down as defined by Fama French). I also 
obtain MKTRF (or Rm-Rf)  that is the excess return on the market. It is calculated as the value-
weight return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks (from CRSP) minus the one-month 
Treasury bill rate. I also get the UMD which calculated the momentum. 
[Insert Table 1] 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for SMB, HML, UMD and Market return minus risk free 
return. During the sample period SMB has a mean of .000042 with a maximum value of .04 and 
a minimum value of -.04. The standard deviation of the sample is 0.0053. During the sample 
period HML has a mean of .0000148 with a maximum value of .03 and a minimum value of -.04. 
The standard deviation of the sample is 0.0054. During the sample period UMD has a mean of 
.0003 with a maximum value of .07 and a minimum value of -.08. The standard deviation of the 
sample is 0.0077. During the sample period MKTRF has a mean of .00029 with a maximum 
value of .09 and a minimum value of -.09. The standard deviation of the sample is 0.0097. 
The multilateral trade-weighted index of the foreign exchange value of the U.S. dollar against the 
currencies of the other countries in the Group of Ten (G-10), developed at the Federal Reserve 
Board in 1971, has played an important role in analysis of foreign influences on the U.S. 
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economy for more than twenty-five years. However, changes in international trading 
relationships and in the structure of international financial markets have led to increased interest 
in the currencies of U.S. trading partners outside the G-10 countries. The trade weighted 
currency index is that of the currencies of important U.S. trading partners. This group is the basis 
for the construction of what the staff terms the broad index of the dollar’s foreign exchange 
value. The broad index includes thirty-five currencies until the beginning of Stage III of EMU on 
January 1, 1999.  At that time, the euro will replace the ten euro-area currencies, and the broad 
index will have twenty-six currencies. Shares in U.S. trade largely determined the currency 
selection for the broad index. The currencies of all foreign countries or regions that had a share 
of U.S. non-oil imports or nonagricultural exports of at least 1⁄2 percent in 1997 are included in 
the broad indexes, as rankings of U.S. trading partners by share of U.S. trade in that year. The 
countries with currencies in the broad index are also important in global trade. The countries and 
regions whose currencies are included in the indexes generate more than 75 percent of the 
world’s gross national product (outside the United States), measured on the basis of purchasing 
power parity. The list of currencies included in the broad index is re-evaluated annually when the 
currency weights are updated2. 
In this study I obtain the daily trade-weighted index and calculate the daily index return as 
 FXRt = (FXt – FXt-1)/FXt-1. 
Where, FXRt = daily trade weighted index return,  FXt = trade weighted index in current time, 
FXt-1 = trade weighted index in pervious time. Table1 reports summary statistics for daily stock 
2 Federal Reserve Bulletin October 1998 
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return. During the sample period FXRt has a mean of -.000023 with a maximum value of 0.02 
and a minimum value of -0.04. The standard deviation of the sample is 0.004. 
I use daily closing stock price from CRISP. The Data range from January 1, 1992 to December 
31, 2011. I found 6,131 firms that have complete data set of up to 5,041 days. Out of that few 
firms have completely blank data so I drop those firms and final number of firm in this study is 
6,117. The total number of observation in the study is 12,665,108. A return is the change in the 
total value of an investment in a common stock over some period of time per dollar of initial 
investment. RET(I) is the return for a sale on day I. It is based on a purchase on the most recent 
time previous to I when the se curity had a valid price. Usually, this time is I - 1. Returns are 
calculated as :For time t (a holding period), let: t = time of last available price < t, r(t) = return on 
purchase at t, sale at t, p(t) = last sale price or closing bid/ask average at time t, d(t) = cash 
adjustment for t, f(t) = price adjustment factor for t, p(t) = last sale price or closing bid/ask 
average at time of last available price < t.  Then I subtract the daily risk free return and calculate 
the daily excess return. 
[Insert table 2] 
The raw data has few extreme values with a maximum return of 1595% and a minimum price of 
-97%. So I followed Huber(1981) and Ruymagaart (1981) I dropped 500 extreme observation 
from top and bottom. So the final number of observation in the study stands at 12,664,108. Table 
2 reports the year by year break down of all firm return during the period of 1992 through 2011, 
with a grand average of .08% daily return. In the year of 2011, 2008 and 2002 the average return 
in negative in the other 17 years have positive return. The lowest return is observed in 2011 (-
0.00051) and highest return is observed in the year 2009 (0.0032). I observe that number of firm 
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increase every year from 1992 to 1997. In 1992 the number of manufacturing firm stood at 2769 
and in 1997 the number reached 3510.Since 1997 every year the number dropped and in 2011 I 
have 1820 manufacturing firms. Using equation 1 I capture the coefficient of foreign exchange 
rate on yearly basis. I find that in year 1996, 2000, 2001,2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010 and 2011 the coefficient is negative and in 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1998, 1999 
and 2002 the coefficient is positive. The maximum value of foreign exchange rate exposure is 
0.05877 and that took place in 1992, the lowest value of foreign exchange rate exposure took 
place in 2003 and the value is -0.00456. The average daily return for the entire sample is 
0.000805 and the average of foreign exchange rate exposure is -0.0288 
I obtain executive compensation data from Compustat Executive Compensation - Annual 
Compensation. From the entire data base I choose the manufacturing firms having sic code 
between 2000 and 4000. I use TDC1 variable from ExuComp, which is total compensation for 
the individual year, comprised of the following: salary, bonus, other annual, total value of stock 
options (using Black-Scholes), long-term incentive payouts, and bonus. I use estimated value of 
in-the-money unexercised vested option and estimated value of in-the-money unexercised 
unvested option. Estimated value of in-the-money unexercised vested option is an estimated 
amount across all of stock option grants. This value is calculated by multiplying the total number 
of vested stock options that are exercisable by the spread. Exercisable options are an estimate of 
the number of stock options from those originally granted that have been held long enough for 
one to have right of ownership and to be available for exercise. Option in-the-money amount 
refers to a gain in an option contract one hold. For a call option, a gain occurs when the 
underlying security's current market price is greater than the option contract price. For a put 
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option, a gain occurs when the underlying security's current market price is less than the option 
contract price. 
The stock option plans becomes vested (become exercisable) on one single date (e.g., four years 
from date of grant). This is referred to as cliff vesting. More frequently, though, awards specify 
that recipients gradually become eligible to exercise their options gradually rather than all at 
once. This is called graded vesting. For instance, a company might award stock options that vest 
25% the first year, 25% the second year, and 50% the third year, or maybe 25% each year for 
four years. In other instance company can choose cliff-vesting plans. It can estimate a single fair 
value for each of the options, even though they vest over different time periods, using a single 
weighted-average expected life of the options. The company then allocates that total 
compensation cost (fair value per option times number of options) over the entire vesting period. 
Vested option thus refers to when one have earned the right of ownership and the stock options 
are eligible for exercise. This variable is termed in ExecuComp as “opt_unex_exer_est_val”. 
For participants in employee stock option plans, unvested options are options that are not yet 
available to exercise under the terms of company’s plan and any agreements between executive 
and the company. It is customary for a company to take back unvested options when an 
employee leaves the company for any reason. Sometimes, however, companies have a severance 
policy that provides special benefits (e.g., accelerated option vesting) for situations like layoffs. 
Companies use stock options to attract and retain talent, and to encourage employees to think 
like owners. Vesting schedules ensure that each employee has a financial incentive to stay with 
the company at least until the vesting period is over.  The value is calculated as the estimated 
aggregate value of in-the-money unvested options at fiscal year-end, calculated based on the 
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difference between the exercise price of the options and the close price of the company's primary 
issue of stock at year end. This variable is termed in ExecuComp as “opt_unex_unexer_est_val”. 
Following Hallahan, Faff, and Mckenzie (2004) and Martin (2009) I use gender and age as a 
control variable. ExecuComp collects up to 9 executives for a given year, though most 
companies do only report 5. Hence, per company one will obtain several entries depending on 
how many executives they file in their proxy statement. I list down how many male top 
executive does a particular firm has in a particular year. I do the same for female top executives. 
And create a new variable called MFRatio which is equal to number of male executives divided 
by number of female executives. I also obtain age data for each executive from the data set of 
ExecuComp –which reports the latest known age of the top executives (5 or 9 depending on 
proxy filing). We calculate the average age of the executives and call it AGE.  
[Insert table 3] 
The result of the match finds 6,075 firms. That means in our study I have 6,075 firms that has the 
stock price data for the length of 5041 days and has executive compensation data available. That 
gives us 10,665,108 observations. Table 3 summarizes the summary statistics. During the sample 
period the foreign exchange rate exposure has an average of -0.003, standard deviation of 0.5, 
and maximum value of 2.6 and a minimum value of -6.096. During the sample period the total 
compensation has an average of $1.992 million, standard deviation of $2.624 million, and 
maximum value of $50.008 million and a minimum value of $0.167 million. During the sample 
period the Male/Female ratio has an average of 4.3, standard deviation of 1.73, and maximum 
value of 4 and a minimum value of 1. During the sample period the average age has an average 
of 54.08, standard deviation of 3.86, and maximum value of 76 and a minimum value of 47. 
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During the sample period the Estimated Value of In-the-Money unexercised vested option for 
executive has an average of $0.231 million, standard deviation of $0.393 million, and maximum 
value of $6.820 million and a minimum value 0.  During the sample period the Estimated Value 
of In-the-Money unexercised unvested option for executive has an average of $0.143 million, 
standard deviation of $0.250 million, and maximum value of $4.363 million and a minimum 
value 0. 
6.0 Empirical Findings: 
From equation 1 I primarily obtain the yearly exchange rate exposure which will be captured in 
β5jk. This operation is performed on the entire data set of 12,664,108 observation. The algorithm 
was carefully designed to capture foreign exchange rate exposure for all firms in all of 20 years 
from 1992 to 2011. To achieve that I perform 52,541 regressions and obtain as many coefficients 
that represent foreign exchange rate exposure for a particular firm in a particular year. 
[Insert table 4] 
Table 4 shows the result obtained from equation 2. For the Total compensation the coefficient is 
-0.000003 standard error is 0.000005 and T-statistics is -0.682 which is not statistically 
significant. For the Executive estimated value of in the money unexercised vested option, the 
coefficient is 0.000072 standard error is 0.000034 and T-statistics is 2.12 which is statistically 
significant. For the Executive estimated value of in the money unexercised vested option, the 
coefficient is -0.000119 standard error is 0.000062 and T-statistics is -1.92 which is statistically 
significant. For the Male/Female the coefficient is -0.0043 standard error is 0.006489 and T-
statistics is -0.67 which is not statistically significant. For the average Age the coefficient is 
0.000141 standard error is 0.0006 and T-statistics is 0.214 which is not statistically significant. 
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As far as sign goes the finding are consistent with existing agency theory literature for total 
compensation. That is a higher value of total compensation means executives’ foreign exchange 
risk is lower. I do not observe any statistical significance of total compensation variable in our 
study.  
The fixed effect and random effect suggest similar result. The Housman test suggest that fixed 
effect is insignificant and Beush-Pagan LM test suggest no exogenous effect exist so pooled OLS 
is the best model to be used.  
Corporate executives’ future wealth is to a large extent linked to their firms’ future performance, 
rendering executives significantly under diversified. One would consequently expect that 
executives would often monetize their in-the-money options soon after those options vest in 
order to diversify their portfolios as argued by Verrecchia (1991), Hall and Murphy (2002). Yet, 
many executives do not do so, voluntarily leaving themselves with a highly-levered long position 
in their firms and making managers’ personal wealth even more susceptible to their firms’ 
fortunes than would hold shares of equivalent value. It stands to reason, then, that holdings of 
vested in-the-money options (in relation to personal wealth) may have information content with 
regard to Executives’ private information about their firms’ future prospects. By voluntarily 
maintaining a highly-levered position, an executive may be aligning with equity holders and 
against debt holders and therefore either anticipate or actively pursue the higher-risk, higher-
return cash flows preferred by equity investors, as opposed to the lower-risk, lower-return cash 
flows preferred by debt investors. Therefore, a natural hypothesis is that executives’ holdings of 
vested in-the-money options (in relation to personal wealth) should be positively associated with 
a firm’s overall risk. 
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Financial economics argues that the relationship between the convexity of a manager’s 
compensation profile and risk-seeking behavior may not be monotonic as argued by Ross (2004). 
Having in-the-money options may prompt an executive to reduce the volatility of a firm’s cash 
flows to prevent the options from going out of the money, in which case unvested in-the-money 
options would be negatively correlated with overall risk. I observe that the coefficient of 
estimated value of in-the-money vested option is positive and estimated value of in-the-money 
unvested is negative. Both coefficients are statistically significant. So the data supports the 
hypothesis. 
The findings are also consistent with the findings of Rajgopal and  Shevlin (2002) Rajgopal and  
Shevlin (2002) and Chen, Steiner and Whyte (2006) Chen, Steiner and Whyte (2006) where 
executive stock option and total compensation can be a means of reducing agency problem as the 
findings suggest a higher value of executive stock option (in the money unexercised)  means 
higher  foreign exchange rate exposure and lower unexercised exercisable option means higher 
foreign exchange rate risk. The findings are not consistent with the findings of Martin (2009) 
which tell that a male dominated firm will be have higher risk compared to a female dominated 
firm. This study didn’t find any evidence of Age influencing foreign exchange rate exposure. 
7.0 Conclusion 
In this study I use some other measurement of executive compensation like option grant, option 
exercise value, and unexercised exercise value for robustness check and the findings are 
consistent. There has been considerable study that investigated overall riskiness of the firm in 
relation to executive pay, but not many such researches has been done to examine the 
relationship between foreign exchange rate exposure and executive compensation. The findings 
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of my research that establishes a relationship between foreign exchange rate exposure and value 
of in-the-money unexercised vested and unvested executive stock option can help understand and 
mange agency conflict puzzle and create interest for future research. The finding of this study 
confirms the wisdom behind the use of executive stock option which helps reduce the agency 
problem. Using pooled OLS, fixed effect panel data and random effect panel data, I find that in 
all 3 model value of in-the-money unexercised vested executive stock option has negative 
coefficient and is statistically significant. At the same time in all 3 models the value of in-the-





Table 1: Summary statistics of variables used in determining foreign exchange exposure 
                
  Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
MKTRF 
    
0.000299  




   
0.090000  




   
10.206270  
HML 
    
0.000148  




   
0.030000  
   
0.000030  
    
0.054973  
     
4.346490  
SMB 
    
0.000042  




   
0.040000  




     
2.823110  
UMD 
    
0.000303  




   
0.070000  













   
0.020000  




     
2.075380  
This table reports the mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness and Kurtosis of 
the variables used in equation used to determine exchange rate exposure. Sample period is 
January 1, 1992 to December31, 2011. Number of observation is 10,665,108. SMB (Small Minus 
Big) is the average return on the three small portfolios minus the average return on the three big 
portfolios. HML (High Minus Low) is the average return on the two value portfolios minus the 
average return on the two growth portfolios. UMD (up minus down) Momentum (Up Minus 
Down as defined by Fama French) and FXRt is the daily trade weighted index return. I obtain 
the Famma-French factor data from Kenneth French's web site at Dartmouth through WRDS 
(Wharton Research Data Service) and obtain the trade weighted broad currency Index from 










 Table 2: Year by year all firm return breakdowns from 1992 to 2011 
Year Mean of RET #of observation #of firms FxExposure 
1992       0.00122  589432 2769          0.05877  
1993       0.00138  621675 2950          0.02481  
1994       0.00047  672528 3108          0.01208  
1995       0.00156  706148 3256          0.01692  
1996       0.00100  757939 3427       (0.01734) 
1997       0.00084  787639 3510          0.02118  
1998       0.00021  767871 3455          0.07452  
1999       0.00179  714739 3273          0.02500  
2000       0.00057  686418 3187       (0.01896) 
2001       0.00132  621066 2943       (0.11701) 
2002     (0.00015) 603922 2640          0.00722  
2003       0.00260  547250 2468       (0.00456) 
2004       0.00063  525044 2407       (0.03472) 
2005       0.00021  519626 2387       (0.01387) 
2006       0.00052  512424 2391       (0.08189) 
2007     (0.00001) 502081 2304       (0.05230) 
2008     (0.00190) 495068 2142       (0.16846) 
2009       0.00322  444791 1996       (0.07872) 
2010       0.00114  411342 1877       (0.13476) 
2011     (0.00051) 398825 1820       (0.09472) 
Grand 
Average 0.0008052     -0.02884109 
This Table reports all firm daily average return, number of observation, number of firm during 
the period, and average foreign exchange exposure during the period on yearly basis. Sample 
period is January 1, 1992 to December31, 2011. Number of observation is 10,665,108. The 
yearly foreign exchange rate exposure is captured using β 5 equation 1 Rjt = αj+ β1jk (MKTRFt) 
+ β 2 jk SMBt + β 3 jk HMLt + β 4 jk UMDt + β 5 jk FXRXt + εjt  I obtain the daily Ret (return) data 
from CRSP(The Center for Research in Security Prices) stock/security file accessed through 






 Table3: Summary statistics used in executive compensation effect determination 
              
  Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
Foreign Exchange rate 
EXPOSURE -0.003 0.500 -5.096 2.601 -0.803 7.817 
Total Compensation 1991.776 2624.251 167.000 50008.417 7.191 95.379 
Male/Female RATIO 4.122 1.727 0.200 11.000 0.127 -0.034 
AGE 48.108 17.054 0.000 79.000 -2.115 3.535 
Estimated Value of In-
the-Money 
Unexercised vested 
option 231.677 393.126 0.000 6820.206 6.667 74.482 
Estimated Value of In-
the-Money 
Unexercised unvested 
option 143.796 250.366 0.000 4363.259 6.597 69.097 
This table shows mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness and kurtosis of 
variables used in equation     FXRiskjk = α + β1 TotalCompnesationjk  + β2 MFRatiojk + β3 Agejk 
+β4 VestedStockOPtionjk +β5 UnEx_ExOptionsjk +υj I obtain executive compensation, age and 
gender data from Standard & Poor's Compustat ExecuComp. Sample period is January 1, 1992 to 











 Table 4: Regression report for Executive compensation analysis 
    Estimated Standard     
  Pooled OLS  Coefficient Error t-statistic 
P-
value 
Panel 1 Constant 0.015706 0.039423 0.398409 [.690] 
 
Total Compensation -0.000003 0.000005 -0.68297 [.495] 
Pooled OLS  Male/Female RATIO -0.004356 0.006489 -0.67132 [.502] 
 
AGE 0.000141 0.000657 0.214346 [.830] 
 
Estimated Value of In-the-
Money Unexercised vested 
option 0.000072 0.000034 2.12934 [.033] 
  
Estimated Value of In-the-
Money Unexercised unvested 
option -0.000119 0.000062 -1.92766 [.054] 
Panel 1 Total Compensation 0.000001 0.000007 0.124925 [.901] 
 
Male/Female RATIO 0.002416 0.009818 0.246116 [.806] 
Fixed Effects - 
Individual (WITHIN) AGE -0.001115 0.000861 -1.29527 [.195] 
 
Estimated Value of In-the-
Money Unexercised vested 
option 0.000160 0.000059 2.7309 [.006] 
  
Estimated Value of In-the-
Money Unexercised unvested 
option -0.000142 0.000081 -1.74184 [.082] 
Panel 3 Constant 0.022215 0.041724 0.532423 [.594] 
 
Total Compensation -0.000003 0.000005 -0.58356 [.560] 
Random Effects - 
Individual – GLS Male/Female RATIO -0.004546 0.006854 -0.6633 [.507] 
 
AGE -0.000074 0.000679 -0.10893 [.913] 
 
Estimated Value of In-the-
Money Unexercised vested 
option 0.000087 0.000036 2.41965 [.016] 
 
Estimated Value of In-the-
Money Unexercised unvested 
option -0.000122 0.000063 -1.91361 [.056] 
  
This table reports the regression results from     FXRiskjk = α + β1 TotalCompnesationjk  + β2 
MFRatiojk + β3 Agejk +β4 VestedStockOPtionjk +β5 UnEx_ExOptionsjk +υj using pooled OLS, 
fixed effect panel and random effect panel data analysis. Sample period is January 1, 1992 to 
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